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THE APPELLATE JUDGE AS THE
THIRTEENTH JUROR:
COMBATTING IMPLICIT BIAS IN
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Andrew S. Pollis †
ABSTRACT
Research has documented the role that implicit bias plays in the
disproportionately high wrongful-conviction rate for people of color.
This Article proposes a novel solution to the problem: empowering
individual appellate judges, even over the dissent of two colleagues, to
send cases back for retrial when the trial record raises suspicions of a
conviction tainted by the operation of implicit racial bias.
Factual review on appeal is unwelcome in most jurisdictions. But
the traditional arguments against it, which highlight the importance of
deference to the jury’s fact-finding powers, are overly simplistic.
Scholars have already demonstrated the relative institutional
competency of appellate judges to review jury verdicts gone awry, even
when the evidence is legally sufficient. The operation of implicit bias in
jury deliberations only enhances the need for this review.
But the review must be more robust than traditional three-judge
panels can offer. Judges, too, fall victim to implicit bias, including bias
in favor of affirming trial-court results. And the demographics of
judges do not reflect those of the populations they serve. So requiring
two of three judges to concur in reversing on a factual review is too
high a burden to achieve the necessary reduction in bias-influenced
wrongful convictions. Each individual judge should have that power.
The benefits to the justice system outweigh the costs.

† Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Thanks to Mikah Thompson for her scholarship, inspiration, and
guidance; to my colleague Cassandra Burke Robertson for her prior work
in this important area; and to colleagues Jonathan Adler, Jessica Berg,
Jonathan Entin, Ayesha Bell Hardaway, Jessie Hill, and Dale Nance for
workshopping an early conception of this Article.
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“I went on trial about nine o’clock in the
morning. Within two hours the jury had come
back with a conviction. I was convicted in their
minds before I went on trial. . . . All that spoke
for me on that witness stand was my black
skin—which didn’t do so good.”
—Haywood Patterson 1
INTRODUCTION
Many scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have
drawn attention to the untenably high rate of wrongful
convictions. 2 DNA-based exonerations have exposed the
HAYWOOD PATTERSON & EARL CONRAD, SCOTTSBORO BOY 13 (1950).
Haywood Patterson was one of nine African-American teenagers
convicted in Alabama in 1931 for raping two white women in a railroad
boxcar, despite the complainants’ demonstrated credibility problems and
physical evidence that contradicted their stories. At one point, a trial judge
granted a new trial based on the weight of the evidence—and in so doing
ended his legal career. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 243–73 (rev. ed. 2007). The case also spawned two
Supreme Court decisions: Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), an early
iteration of the constitutional right to counsel in state-court criminal
proceedings; and Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), addressing the
systematic exclusion of African-American citizens from jury service. The
Scottsboro trials also have been the subject of many historical and creative
works, including several books, e.g., CARTER, supra, a television drama,
JUDGE HORTON AND THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS (Tomorrow Entertainment
1976), an Oscar-nominated documentary film, SCOTTSBORO: AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY (PBS 2001), and a Tony Award-nominated Broadway musical,
DAVID THOMPSON, JOHN KANDER & FRED EBB, THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS
(2010). Though racism in the criminal-justice system is not always as overt
today as it was in 1931 Alabama, this Article demonstrates that implicit
bias continues to play an insidious role in wrongful conviction. An
individual judge’s power to grant a new trial to combat implicit bias
remains as important today as invoking that power to combat explicit bias
was a century ago.
2 See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 634 (2009) (“Incongruously . . . searching review in
criminal cases is diminishing, even as recognition of the problem of
wrongful convictions is increasing.”).
1
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numbers: trial courts routinely convict individuals of crimes
they did not commit. 3 We know two additional things about
these wrongful convictions: (1) people of color are overrepresented in the populations of wrongfully convicted
individuals; 4 and (2) appellate courts have largely failed to
ferret out the mistaken trial results. 5
The causes of wrongful convictions are obviously
manifold. But we know that race plays a significant role. 6
And we know that people who serve on juries—and judges
too—harbor implicit biases against people of different races.
The scholarly literature is replete with evidence establishing
the ways in which implicit bias influences outcomes. 7 So it is
impossible not to infer a strong causal connection between
these biases and high rate of wrongful convictions among
defendants of color. We also can infer that many appellate
3 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed
Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1281, 1282 (2004) (“DNA analysis has resulted in a troubling number
of exonerations in both capital and noncapital cases.”).
4 See, e.g., Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”:
A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 567
(2009) (“The very act of a Black defendant coming into court has some
probative value; that is, race has a tendency to prove or disprove
something in the American justice system just as it does in society at
large.”).
5 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 129 (2008) (The disproportionate number of convicted minorities later
exonerated by DNA evidence “should only elevate our unease over how
effectively our system judges innocence.”).
6 See, e.g., Mikah K. Thompson, Bias on Trial: Toward an Open Discussion
of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 1267
(2018) (“Legal scholars have argued that where holes exist in the
prosecution’s case, jurors tend to fill in the gaps or ‘complete the story’ by
turning to racial stereotypes”).
7 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11
(2007); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Implicit Bias in
Judicial Decision Making: How it Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do
About It, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 87, 91–92 (Sarah E.
Redfield ed., 2017).
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judges are themselves unable to overcome their implicit
biases, including an “affirmation bias” that results in
unwarranted deference to even erroneous trial-court results. 8
We value the role that appellate courts play in guarding
against wrongful convictions, 9 but the currently available
remedies on appeal are inadequate. 10 The standard to
challenge evidentiary sufficiency assumes the credibility of
trial-court witnesses (leaving to the jury the job of selecting
whom to believe) and indulges all inferences consistent with
the verdict. 11 It asks not whether the verdict was correct, but
instead whether there was sufficient evidence that, if
believed, supports it. 12 The aim of a sufficiency challenge is to
intercept a wrongful conviction, but by design it focuses on
the mere existence of evidence supporting guilt, not on its
quality. 13 And that turns out not to be enough protection for
the innocent.
But there is another way, at least in theory. Two states—
Ohio and Illinois—permit appellate judges to vacate a
conviction and remand for a new trial if they believe the
evidence, though legally sufficient, is not strong enough to
uphold the conviction. 14 A third state, New York, also
authorizes manifest-weight review, and reversal on that basis
8 See, e.g., Barry C. Edwards, Why Appeals Courts Rarely Reverse Lower
Courts: An Experimental Study to Explore Affirmation Bias, 68 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE 1035, 1043–44 (2019); Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The
Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the ‘Affirmance Effect’ on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 377 (2005).
9 See, e.g., Findley, supra note 2, at 591.
10 Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the CivilCriminal Division, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 482 (2004) (“[F]or all the attention
given the problem of wrongful convictions, and all the remedies
proposed, the discussion has included no consideration of a greater role
for courts considering direct appeals from convictions.”).
11 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
12 See, e.g., Findley, supra note 2, at 602.
13 Garrett, supra note 5, at 126 (“Our system of criminal review
certainly does not privilege factual claims.”).
14 See, e.g., State v. Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d 541, 546 (Ohio 1994); People
v. Nicholls, 245 N.E.2d 771, 774–75 (Ill. 1969).
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leads to the defendant’s discharge without a new trial. 15
Some federal appellate courts have also, occasionally,
recognized this form of appellate review. 16 The appellate
court in these jurisdictions can function as the “thirteenth
juror” whose disagreement with the other twelve undoes the
verdict. 17 But most federal courts and most states have little or
no body of law empowering them to invoke this thirteenthjuror remedy on appeal; 18 instead, they typically reserve all
discretion to order a new trial in the trial-court judge alone. 19
And that trial-court discretion has left us with wrongful
convictions.
Even in the states that permit appellate courts to order a
new trial based on weight of the evidence, that relief is tightly
constrained by almost-insurmountable legal standards.
Courts tend to defer to jurors who, by virtue of having
observed the live testimony, are supposedly better at

See, e.g., People v. Cahill, 809 N.E.2d 561, 583–84 (N.Y. 2003) (citing
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.15(5) (McKinney 2009)); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW
§ 470.20(5) (McKinney 2009).
16 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV.
157, 171 n.80 (2008) (collecting cases).
17 See, e.g., Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). Ironically, some
literature uses the “thirteenth juror” metaphor to describe prejudice in
jury deliberations rather than the appellate guardrail against it. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth L. Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the
Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1992);
see also United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., dissenting).
18 “[W]eight-of-the-evidence review has continued to be treated as an
afterthought in federal court and as a local quirk of procedure in state
court.” Cassandra Burke Robertson, Invisible Error, 50 CONN. L. REV. 161,
189 (2018). Texas and Florida formerly permitted reversal on the weight
of the evidence but no longer do. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. 2010); Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981), aff’d, 457
U.S. 31 (1982). Other jurisdictions have never allowed it. See Risinger,
supra note 3, at 1315 n.168 (identifying eight jurisdictions); see also State v.
Brown, No. A05-2418, 2007 WL 46063, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2007);
State v. Bembenek, 331 N.W.2d 616 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
19 See Risinger, supra note 3, at 1315.
15
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assessing credibility. 20 But research demonstrates the
opposite—that jurors are actually bad at assessing
credibility, 21 especially when race enters the equation. 22 By
contrast, a transcript of the trial—though it may lack the
dramatic spectacle of the live event—turns out to have certain
advantages over live testimony for combating implicit bias
and for synthesizing evidence from multiple witnesses. 23
The sheer numbers cry out for a fix. They prove that
appellate courts fail to serve as adequate safeguards against
wrongful convictions, especially when implicit bias is in
play. 24 As Keith Findley has argued, appellate courts should
“undertake more rigorous review of facts on appeal.” 25
Cassandra Burke Robertson and Michael Risinger have made
similar arguments. 26 I agree with them fully.
But universalizing manifest-weight review on appeal, as
much as it may help, would not likely be enough. It is
doubtful that two out of three appellate judges sitting on a
panel—much less all three, as required in Ohio 27—would
adequately recognize and remediate convictions tainted by
implicit bias. Among other things, the composition of the
judiciary is not reflective of the racial makeup of the country, 28
See, e.g., id at 1314; Findley, supra note 2, at 620.
See, e.g., Oldfather, supra note 10, at 440; Findley, supra note 2, at 627.
22 Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of
Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 268 (1996).
23 See Oldfather, supra note 21, at 440.
24 See Thompson, supra note 6, at 1252 (“Because racial and ethnic
stereotypes are part and parcel of American culture, our justice system
must do more to ensure that jury verdicts are not influenced by
stereotyped beliefs.”).
25 Findley, supra note 2, at 609.
26 See Robertson, supra note 16, at 170–72; Risinger, supra note 3, at
1313–16.
27 See infra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
28 “Today, more than 73 percent of sitting federal judges are men and
80 percent are white.” Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini, & Grace Oyenubi,
Building a More Inclusive Federal Judiciary 1 (Oct. 2019),
https://cf.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/JudicialDiversity-report20
21
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much less of the criminal-justice system. 29 And we know that
the lack of diversity among judges has real implications for
the way they judge. 30
So my prescriptive proposal goes further: we should boost
the power not only of the appellate courts, but of individual
appellate judges: in the face of a challenge to the weight of the
evidence leading to a conviction, an appellate court should
order a new trial unless all three judges on the panel agree with
the jury’s assessment of the evidence. If any one judge
believes the evidence was not convincing enough for a jury to
have convicted, then the defendant should get a new trial—
even if the other two appellate-panel members and the
presiding trial judge disagree. This proposal would give each
judge the power to serve as the “thirteenth juror” and to
override any perceived implicit bias that may have infected
the trial result or the results of her appellate colleagues. If
none of them chooses to order a new trial, we can have greater
confidence in the integrity of the verdict. But if one appellate
judge—even just one—sees a conviction that may have been
the product of implicit bias, that judge may be an innocent
defendant’s last best hope to avoid an unjust loss of liberty or
life. The costs are worth it. 31
3.pdf?_ga=2.78140308.1495771030.1643469480-574958456.1643469479
(citing Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Article III Federal
Judges,
1789-present:
Advanced
Search
Criteria,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search
(last
visited Jan. 29, 2022)).
29 See generally Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic
Disparity in State Prisons 6 (Oct. 2021) (“Black people are incarcerated at a
rate of 1240 per 100,000 while white people are incarcerated at a rate of
261
per
100,000”),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-EthnicDisparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf.
30 Root et al., supra note 28, at 2–3; see also Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra
note 7, at 110 (“Research reveals that improving the diversity of appellate
court panels can affect outcomes.”).
31 Cf. Garrett, supra note 13, at 126 (““Further reforms aimed at
providing more robust factual review would come at a cost that our
system has so far not been willing to bear.”); see also Risinger, supra note 3,
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets the stage for
the problem by reviewing the insidious role implicit bias
plays in convicting defendants of color. Part II then turns to
extant forms of appellate review, revealing that appellate
courts are generally hostile toward robust scrutiny of jurors’
factual findings, often articulating flawed notions of relative
institutional competency. In fact, as Part III explains,
appellate judges are actually well positioned to intercede
when the evidence at trial leaves room for doubt about the
role bias has played in the jury’s verdict. I offer my
prescriptive solution in Part IV—a solution that would
empower individual appellate judges—not just panels—to
order new trials when bias may have invaded the fact finders’
deliberations.
The scholarly literature demonstrates the foundation for
my proposal. 32 It is replete with studies of the dangers posed
by implicit bias and includes suggestions for avoiding it,
usually at the trial stage. 33 The literature also verifies the
unacceptably high rate of wrongful convictions and the
appellate reluctance to order new trials on the basis of factual
at 1282 (“Systemic complacency with the old ways of dealing with the
issues is simply unacceptable, unless we are to adopt a version of the
extreme position espoused by William Paley in the eighteenth century:
that such convictions, however many there are, are simply the price of
security, and the wrongfully convicted should be viewed as necessary,
and even honorable, casualties in the war on crime.” (citing WILLIAM
PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 553 (1785));
Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 105 (2003)
(“According to this mindset, the execution of innocent people is, at worst,
a cost insufficient to overrule our legislative fondness for the death
penalty. At best, it is a cost outweighed by the societal benefits from
retribution and deterrence that we get from capital punishment.”).
32 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 345 (“It must be almost selfevident that if you have a right to show that racial discrimination denied
you employment, then you must also have a right to show racial
discrimination denied you liberty or is about to deny you life.”).
33 See, e.g., Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial:
The Innocence Revolution and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial,
3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 189 (2015) (surveying various proposed trial reforms).
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sufficiency. This Article ties all those threads together and
proposes a novel solution to the problem of wrongful
conviction that, if adopted, could be a meaningful path to
redress some of the systemic racism that infects the criminaljustice system.
I.

IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS, BAKED INTO OUR CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS.

When Alabama convicted Haywood Patterson of rape, 34
he was but one of many defendants in the century following
the Civil War whose convictions followed explicit
prosecutorial “reliance on race as a proxy for credibility.” 35 On
paper, race has played no role in witness competency since
Reconstruction, but “both law and lore document the
persistence of race-based assessments of credibility
throughout the Jim Crow era.” 36 Courts are now largely
intolerant of explicit invocations of race as evidence of
credibility or criminal conduct, 37 but there is every reason to
See supra note 1.
See Johnson, supra note 22, at 269; see also, e.g., Holland v. State, 22
So. 2d 519, 520 (Ala. 1945) (upholding conviction despite prosecutor’s
encouragement of jury to “‘consider the fact that Mary Sue Rowe is a
young white woman and that this defendant is a black man for the
purpose of determining his intent at the time he entered Mrs. Rowe's
home’”); Taylor v. State, 100 S.W. 393, 393 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1907)
(reversing conviction where prosecutor argued: “‘I am well enough
acquainted with this class of niggers to know that they have got it in for
the [white] race in their heart, and in their hearts call them all white sons
of bitches.’”).
36 Johnson, supra note 22, at 268.
37 See id. at 321. Sadly, there remain lingering cases exhibiting explicit
bias—such as a prosecutor who asked this question of a defendant on
cross-examination in a 2011 trial: “’You've got African–Americans, you've
got Hispanics, you've got a bag full of money. Does that tell you—a light
bulb doesn't go off in your head and say, This is a drug deal?’” See
Calhoun v. United States, 568 U.S. 1206, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1136 (2013)
(statement of Sotomayor, J.). Justice Sotomayor excoriated the
prosecutor’s “attempt to substitute racial stereotype for evidence, and
34
35
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believe they remain subtext, deliberately so or not, when
jurors assess the guilt or innocence of African-American
defendants and the credibility of African-American
witnesses. It remains the case that “black defendants fare
worse in court than do their white counterparts.” 38 Indeed, the
American justice system has a long history of rules designed
explicitly to discriminate against African-Americans. 39 Racial
bias is baked into the cake.
A. Two Systems Govern Our Mental Processing: System 1
(Intuitive) and System 2 (Deliberative)
Before we zero in on racism in the criminal-justice system,
we need to step back and take a broader view of the cake.
Researchers have thoroughly documented the influence of
implicit bias over our judgments—about any number of
subjects, not just those implicating race. Implicit bias involves
the extent to which a decision maker regulates the interplay
between her intuitive and deliberate methods of scrutiny:
“Decades of psychological research has revealed that humans
use two systems to make decisions: System 1,” which is “fast,
automatic, and instinctive,” and “System 2,” which is slow,
deliberate, and analytic.” 40 The degree to which decision
makers allow System 1 to influence an ultimate decision,
rather than overcome it with System 2 thinking, will
determine whether implicit bias plays a role in the ultimate
outcome. 41
racial prejudice for reason” and wrote, “I hope never to see a case like this
again.” Id. at 1137–38.
38 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich &
Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009).
39 See Johnson, supra note 22, at 267–76 (tracing history of interplay
between race and credibility determinations in U.S. courts).
40 Edwards, supra note 8, at 1043.
41 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness
Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich
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Researchers have developed methods of testing the effect
of implicit bias. Perhaps the best recognized example is the
Implicit Association Test, available on the Harvard University
website for anyone to take. 42 Shane Frederick also developed
a cognitive-reflection test 43 to measure how well people
successfully override their System 1 intuitive thinking with
deliberation. 44 “Most people, it turns out, are unable or
unwilling to suppress that impulsive response.” 45 And their
failure to do so, “can ‘lead to severe and systematic errors.’” 46

et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter “HEURISTICS”] (“System 1 quickly proposes
intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2
monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or
override. The judgments that are eventually expressed are called intuitive
if they retain they hypothesized initial proposal without much
modification.”); see also Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in
HEURISTICS, supra, at 379, 391 (“The rule-based system can suppress the
response of the associative system in the sense that it can overrule it.
However, the associative system always has its opinion heard and,
because of its speed and efficiency, often precedes and thus neutralizes
the rule-based response.”).
42
The
Implicit
Association
Test,
available
at
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html, was developed by
Tony Greenwald, Mahzarin Banaji, and Brian Nosek and “is the product
of decades of research on the study of bias and stereotypes.” Rachlinski et
al., supra note 38, at 1198.
43 Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 26-28 (2006).
44 Frederick’s test is comprised of three questions that strongly suggest
answers that are intuitive (System 1) but incorrect; only by applying
deliberative (System 2) reasoning will a subject divine the correct answer.
See Guthrie et al., supra note 7, at 11 (quoting Frederick, supra note 43, at
27–28, 29 tbl. 1). The questions are “simple in that ‘their solution is easily
understood when explained, yet reaching the correct answer often
requires the suppression of an erroneous answer that springs
“impulsively” to mind.’” Id. (quoting Frederick, supra note 43, at 27).
45 Guthrie et al., supra note 44, at 11; see also Rachlinski & Wistrich,
supra note 7, at 91–92.
46 Guthrie et al., supra note 44, at 31 (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124,
1124 (1974)).
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B. Intuitive Thinking Permits Implicit Bias to Infect Jury
Verdicts
That brings us to racial bias. Not surprisingly, implicit bias
(System 1 decision making) is “the likely pathway by which
undesirable influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness
of parties, affect the legal system.” 47 And “[s]ocial science
research has made clear that a majority of Americans” carry
predispositions “against racial minorities, which “manifests
itself in the application of racial stereotypes.” 48 In short, “one
man’s ‘intuition’ is another man’s irrational prejudice.” 49 And
these racial stereotypes, in turn, have four chilling
manifestations in the criminal-justice system that work
together against African-American defendants in insidious
tandem.
First, jurors often associate blackness with certain crimes, 50
and that association facilitates a verdict of conviction (which
conforms to, rather than challenges, jurors’ biased
predispositions). 51
Id.; see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias,
94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 973 (2006) (“[I]mplicit bias--like many of the heuristics
and biases emphasized elsewhere—tends to have an automatic character,
in a way that bears importantly on its relationship to legal prohibitions.”).
48 Thompson, supra note 6, at 1244; see also id. at 1222 (“a majority of
white jurors will harbor implicit white preferences”).
49 Roth, supra note 57, at 1696.
50 See Thompson, supra note 6, at 1249 (“[R]esearchers have found that
jurors tend to make decisions based on stereotypes where the defendant
is accused of a crime that is ‘stereotypically associated’ with the
defendant’s racial group and that jurors will punish these defendants
more severely.” (quoting Melinda Jones, Preventing the Application of
Stereotypic Biases in the Courtroom: The Role of Detailed Testimony, 20 J. APP.
SOC. PSY. 1767, 1768 (1997))); see also id. at 1258 (“Just as propensity
evidence might prime a jury to find that an individual acted in conformity
with past behavior, race-coded language might prime a jury to find that
an individual acted in conformity with widely known stereotypes about
the individual’s racial or ethnic group.”).
51 Id. at 1267 (“Legal scholars have argued that where holes exist in the
prosecution’s case, jurors tend to fill in the gaps or ‘complete the story’ by
turning to racial stereotypes.”).
47
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Second, white jurors are predisposed to make negative
credibility judgments against African-American witnesses. 52
Joseph Rand has posited that “a ‘[d]emeanor [g]ap exists
when jurors of one race are called upon to assess the
credibility and demeanor of a witness of a different race,”
preventing even “well-intentioned and low-prejudiced
jurors” from reliably assessing “’the demeanor of a witness of
a different race because they are unable to accurately decipher
the cues that the witness uses to communicate sincerity.’” 53
That demeanor gap hinders an African-American defendant’s
ability to present exculpatory evidence (including her own
testimony) that jurors would be receptive to believing. 54
Third, white witnesses are more likely to provide
mistaken identification testimony when the defendant is
African-American 55—a phenomenon that contributes to most
of the wrongful convictions of defendants subsequently
exonerated by DNA evidence. 56
Johnson, supra note 22, at 326 (“[T]he cognitive structures of many
decision makers predispose them to believe that race influences both the
ability and propensity to tell the truth.”).
53 Thompson, supra note 6, at 1264–65 (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection,
and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)); see also Montré D. Carodine,
Contemporary Issues in Critical Race Theory: The Implications of Race as
Character Evidence in Recent High-Profile Cases, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 679, 688
(2014).
54 Thompson, supra note 6, at 1262 (“[J]urors who are more influenced
by racial stereotypes are likely to be more suspicious of African-American
witnesses.”). Professor Thompson has documented the effect of this racebased suspicion in the context of the high-profile trial of George
Zimmerman for the killing of Trayvon Martin—a trial in which a pivotal
prosecution witness, an African-American woman, was speaking with
Martin by phone immediately before the encounter between the two men.
See id. at 1259–60.
55 Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Policy 104D: Cross-Racial
Identification, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 917, 918 (2008) (“Persons of one racial group
may have greater difficulty distinguishing among individual faces of
persons in another group than among faces of persons in own group.”).
56 Garrett, supra note 5, at 78 (“The overwhelming number of
convictions of the innocent involved eyewitness identification . . . .”); see
52
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And fourth, racial bias and different perceptions of police
encounters 57 cause white juries “to overvalue confession
evidence” from African-American defendants, 58 despite
research demonstrating that police extract false confessions
from African-American defendants more frequently than
from their white counterparts. 59 White jurors—even those
who have been questioned by police—are less likely to have
experienced the degree of threatening circumstances that

also id. at 70 (“Cross-racial identifications may be one explanation for the
disproportionate conviction of minorities among those exonerated by
postconviction DNA testing.); Findley, supra note 2, at 596 (“Garrett’s
analysis of the first 200 DNA exonerations shows that eyewitnesses
offered mistaken identification evidence in 79% of these cases.”).
57 “Today, Black Americans are more likely than whites to encounter
police, to be stopped by police, and to be fatally wounded by police.” Evan
D. Bernick, Antisubjugation and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 110 GEO. L.J.
1, 73 (2021). That experience has an obvious impact on their perception of
those encounters. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald
Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 853 (2009) (“[P]eople are
likely to construe the facts . . .in a way that reinforces the beliefs that
predominate among their peers.”); see also Andrea Roth, Defying DNA:
Rethinking the Role of the Jury in an Age of Scientific Proof of Innocence, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 1643, 1656 (2013) (“jurors engage[] in ‘motivated cognition,’” a
phenomenon causing “their ideologies [to] affect[] what appear[] to them
to be simply objective factfinding” (quoting Kahan et al.,. supra, at 851)).
58 Roth, supra note 57, at 1673; see also id. at 1696 (“In one study, 81% of
125 cases involving false confessions ended in conviction.”).
59 See generally Cynthia J. Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in Criminal
Interrogations: Why Innocent Black Suspects Are at Risk for Confessing Falsely,
17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 562 (2011); see also Garrett, supra note 5, at 88–
89 (reporting that, as of 2008, sixteen percent of wrongfully convicted
defendants exonerated by DNA evidence had given false confessions).
White jurors may also mistakenly infer that an African-American
defendant’s silence in response to questioning is an acknowledgment of
criminal liability. See generally Mikah Thompson, A Culture of Silence:
Exploring the Impact of the Historically Contentious Relationship Between
African-Americans and the Police, 85 UMKC L. REV. 697 (2016).
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would sway an African-American arrestee to confess falsely 60
and therefore less likely to understand that choice.
To make matters worse, the trial process itself can
exacerbate the application of these stereotypes. Lawyers
exploit these manifestations by “routinely plac[ing] covert,
implicit race-based character evidence before juries. Because
such evidence is subliminal, playing upon the jury’s most
deep-seated prejudices, it escapes” judicial review. 61 Trial
judges, for their part, “encourage jurors to use their life
experiences and common sense to assess trial evidence . . . .” 62
That sort of instruction invites, rather than discourages, resort
to System 1 intuition, thus making it more likely a juror’s
implicit bias will play a role in her verdict. Jury service also
takes people away from their other life obligations, leaving
many of them “under stress and pressed for time” and thus
“more likely to rely upon stereotypes” rather than take the
time to overcome those stereotypes with System 2 thinking. 63
In short, the trial process almost invites intuitive decision
making rather than providing adequate safeguards against it.
C. Judges Fail to Remediate the Problem.
Nor should we allow ourselves to believe that judges will
consistently save the day. Judges largely fail to curtail the
60 See generally Najdowski, supra note 59; see also Andrew E. Taslitz,
Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 121, 132 (2006) (describing environment that would lead an
African-American detainee to confess falsely).
61 Thompson, supra note 6, at 1254 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1244
(“These stereotypes can influence many aspects of the jury’s functions.“).
The racial bias manifests itself not only in trials of African-American
defendants, but also of white defendants tried for crimes against AfricanAmerican victims. “The traditional refusal of white juries to convict white
defendants accused of crimes of violence against African American
victims is notorious: credible accusations backed by powerful physical
evidence, countered only by obviously false denials, routinely led to
acquittals.” Johnson, supra note 22, at 275.
62 Thompson, supra note 6, 1301.
63 Id. at 1249.
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effect of racial bias in jury deliberations (even if they are able
to detect it). To be sure, trial judges in some jurisdictions have
the power to set aside convictions and order new trials for a
variety of reasons, including their own assessment of the
evidence. 64 And, as discussed below, some appellate court
also can order new trials on the weight of the evidence. 65 But
“[s]tudies of judges indicate that they are not, by nature,
System 2 thinkers . . . .” 66 Rather, judges—like the rest of us—
“follow their intuition, even though it is wrong.” 67 Among
other things, judges have demonstrated an inability to ignore
inadmissible information in their decision making. 68
More specifically, “[j]udges harbor the same measure of
implicit biases concerning African-Americans as most lay
adults.” 69 Indeed, researchers using the Implicit Association
Test have detected “a strong white preference” in white
judges, 70 stronger even than non-judges who took the same
test. 71 So there is no reason to believe that African-American
defendants can rely consistently on white judges, at the trial
or appellate level, to undo wrongful convictions that were the
product of implicit racial bias. 72
D. The Wrongful-Conviction Statistics Are Stunning
What the theory suggests, the hard evidence confirms. The
wave of DNA exonerations in the last few decades “is, or at
least should be, an astonishing revelation.” 73 It has poured
cold water over any smoldering belief that our judicial system
See infra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 166–206 and accompanying text.
66 Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 7, at 92.
67 Id. at 95.
68 Id. at 92.
69 Id. at 100.
70 Rachlinski et al., supra note 38, at 1210.
71 Id. at 1211.
72 But see id. at 1195 (“[G]iven sufficient motivation, judges can
compensate for the influence of these biases.”).
73 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 442.
64
65
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did an acceptable job of convicting only the guilty or of
overturning wrongful convictions on appeal. 74 Hundreds of
convicted individuals in the United States “have been
exonerated by DNA testing, including 21 who served time on
death row.” 75 Most of these exonerations occurred even after
appellate courts had affirmed the convictions. 76 And what is
perhaps most stark about the statistics is the disproportionate
number of minorities: “Many more exonerees were minorities
(71%) than is typical even among average populations of rape
and murder convicts.” 77 That number is comprised primarily
of “citizens wrongfully convicted by juries who credited
confessions and eyewitnesses.” 78
Of course, the DNA-exoneration cases are the tip of the
iceberg; they occur by definition only in cases that yield DNA
evidence, which tend to be those involving murder and rape. 79
But most wrongful convictions “remain hidden because they
occur in cases where DNA analysis has no application.” 80
There would not necessarily be DNA evidence, for example,
in robbery, assault, or drug cases. So the DNA statistics give
us only a limited window into the magnitude of the problem,
which may “harm tens or even hundreds of thousands of
black defendants every year.” 81
See Findley, supra note 2, at 593.
Innocence Project, https://innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last
visited Dec. 21, 2021); see also Garrett, supra note 13, at 61 (“By May 2007,
postconviction DNA testing had exonerated 200 persons in the United
States.”); Risinger, supra note 3, at 1282 (“DNA analysis has resulted in a
troubling number of exonerations in both capital and noncapital cases.”).
76 Edwards, supra note 8, at 1036; see also Findley, supra note 2, at 594
(“only 14% of defendants” who were subsequently exonerated by
biological evidence had “won reversal of their convictions on appeal
(citing Garrett, supra note 5, at 61)).
77 Garrett, supra note 5, at 66; see also id. at 129 (“These innocence cases
include a disproportionate number of minorities . . . .”).
78 Roth, supra note 57, at 1656.
79 See Garrett, supra note 13, at 73.
80 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1282.
81 Rachlinski et al., supra note 38, at 1202.
74
75
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Indeed, we can extrapolate from the DNA numbers
because we have other statistics about the rate of wrongful
conviction. We know, based on “empirical studies by social
scientists,” 82 that juries decide cases inaccurately in one out of
every eight or nine cases. 83 That number is astounding and
deserves repeating: one out of every eight or nine. 84
None of this is new. What I have recounted in this part is
based on research that scholars have been writing about for
years. It is a travesty that our legal system has so far done
almost nothing to intercede. In fact, as I demonstrate in the
next part, we have been clinging to false maxims of
institutional competency to defend this flawed system rather
than institute true reform.
II.

APPELLATE COURTS, EXCESSIVELY DEFERENTIAL TO
JURIES, HAVE FAILED TO INTERCEDE IN OVERTURNING
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS.

“One of the most striking features of appellate courts in
the United States is that they rarely reverse lower court
decisions.” 85 The reversal rate, in both state and federal courts,
is less than ten percent. 86 While “our elaborate system for
appeals is intended to guard against wrongful conviction of
the innocent,” we know that “the appellate process in
criminal cases is largely a failure on this most important

See Robertson, supra note 16, at 204.
See Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 307 (2007)).
84 To be sure, the precise number may be unknowable, and the very
process of quantifying the rate of wrongful convictions has been the
subject of its own scholarship. See, e.g., Marvin Zalman & Robert J. Norris,
Measuring Innocence: How to Think About the Rate of Wrongful Conviction, 24
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 601 (2021).
85 Edwards, supra note 8, at 1035.
86 Id. at 1037–38; see also Garrett, supra note 5, at 98 (reporting similar
statistics in death-penalty cases).
82
83
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score.” 87 Simply put, the reversal rate is lower than the
wrongful-conviction rate. This part examines why that is so.
A. The Appellate Process Emphasizes Procedure, Not Accuracy
The primary cause of the mismatch between the
conviction and reversal rates is that appellate courts do a poor
job of considering “the guilt or innocence of the convicted”;
instead, they focus primarily on “remedying procedural
transgressions.” 88 While “fact-finding accuracy is the driving
objective,” 89 the consensus of scholars is that “[a]ppellate
courts generally do not directly address fact-bound questions
like guilt or innocence, or truth. For the most part, innocence
is not a cognizable claim on appeal.” 90
To be sure, procedural rules are crucial, and appellate
courts should certainly provide relief when trial courts violate
them. But procedural error is an “indirect path” to reversal, 91
often tangential to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.
So it should not be the whole ball game. Put another way,
appellate success for a wrongfully convicted person should
not hinge a showing of coincidental procedural error; there
must also be a meaningful mechanism to challenge the
ultimate finding of guilt or innocence when that finding is
mistaken.
87 Findley, supra note 2, at 591–92; see also id. at 595 (“The appellate
process has “simply failed to distinguish between actually innocent
appellants and the general populace of appellants . . . .”).
88 Stephanie Roberts Hartung, The Confluence of Factors Doctrine: A
Holistic Approach to Wrongful Convictions, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 369, 374–
75 (2018) (emphasis added). Procedural errors can include defective
indictments, violations of speedy-trial rights, erroneous jury instructions,
and evidentiary errors. See generally RICHARD H. PARSONS, POSSIBLE ISSUES
FOR
REVIEW
IN
CRIMINAL
APPEALS
(2d
ed.),
https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Issues4r.pdf.
89 Findley, supra note 2, at 592.
90 Id. at 601–02 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 602 (“[A]ppellate courts
defer to trial courts almost completely on ultimate factual questions
regarding guilt and innocence.”).
91 See id. at 602.
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The need for that meaningful mechanism is all the
stronger in light of the role that we now appreciate implicit
bias plays in the wrongful-conviction rate. Since we know
that implicit bias is a source of error, reason dictates it should
also be a basis for error correction on appeal. But it is not: the
law does not recognize a pathway to challenge the effect of
implicit bias on the conviction. Implicit bias is “not subject to
[appellate] challenge through any existing legal
mechanism.” 92
B. Sufficiency Review Ignores Implicit Bias
1. Sufficiency Review Focuses on the Existence of
Evidence, Not on Its Quality
The primary extant mechanism for challenging the
substance of a guilty verdict is to challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, usually in the form of review of the trial
court’s denial of a motion for acquittal. 93 But “challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence almost never succeed in
criminal appeals.” 94 It is a “very difficult standard to meet”
and “is seldom productive to raise . . . on appeal.” 95
Johnson, supra note 22, at 342; see also id. at 266 (“[T[here is no
established mechanism for challenging racially biased credibility
determinations.”). Even explicit bias is redressable only in the rare
occasions when it comes to light through serendipitous revelations that
occur despite the secrecy of jury deliberations is designed to prevent. See
Robertson, supra note 18, at 165 (discussing Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017)).
93 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
316 (1979) (“[N]no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal
conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every
element of the offense.”).
94 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 441; see also id. at 478 (“[T]here appears
to be universal agreement that appellate courts almost never reverse
convictions on sufficiency grounds.”); WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING
EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 75 (1990); (“[A]ppellate courts almost
never reverse convictions on sufficiency grounds.”).
95 PARSONS, supra note 88, at 149.
92
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It was not until 1970, in In re Winship, 96 that the Supreme
Court “held for the first time that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal
case against conviction ‘except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.’” 97 Nine years later, the Court
cemented the standard in Jackson v. Virginia, requiring federal
courts to apply it when reviewing state-court convictions in
habeas corpus proceedings. The Court specifically
distinguished the required standard from the “’no evidence’
rule” some courts had followed, finding the latter “simply
inadequate to protect against misapplications of the
constitutional standard of reasonable doubt.” 98 And when an
appellate court reverses for evidentiary insufficiency, the case
ends with no retrial; the defendant cannot be placed in
jeopardy a second time. 99
That higher standard under Jackson sounds meaningful in
rooting out wrongful convictions on direct appeal. But
appellate judges, like the juries who render the verdicts they
review, carry their own implicit biases. 100 Moreover,
sufficiency review involves by design a highly deferential
standard. The Jackson Court emphasized that a court should
not “’ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (quoting Winship, 397
U.S. at 364).
98 Id. at 320; see also Findley, supra note 2, at 602.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see also Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (“Given the requirements for entry of a
judgment of acquittal, the purposes of the Clause would be negated were
we to afford the government an opportunity for the proverbial ‘second
bite at the apple.’”). The protections against double jeopardy apply with
equal force in state-court criminal proceedings. See Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 748, 794 (1969) (“[T]he double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment [applies] to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
100 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
96
97
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established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 101 Instead, the
court asks whether “any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 102 So a reviewing court must still defer to the
factfinder’s traditional power “to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts” and must view
all the evidence in “the light most favorable to the
prosecution.” 103 And, under that persistently deferential
standard, “courts are almost never willing to direct an
acquittal where the state offers testimonial evidence of guilt. 104
In effect, “Jackson ensured that so long as jurors came to
personally believe a confession or eyewitness, their guilty
verdict would almost surely escape review, however
irrational.” 105 So “the Jackson standard has turned out to be no
different [from] the ‘some evidence’ standard that preceded
it.” 106
2. Sufficiency Review Assumes Unbiased Juries
There is a convenience factor at work here. A highly
deferential standard “allows judges—especially appellate
judges—to avoid responsibility for the conviction of the
factually innocent.” 107 And, in the process, implicit bias slips
through the cracks because the sufficiency standard does not
consider it. It looks only to the existence of evidence
supporting the conviction, not its reliability. Some states have
doctrines declaring a case legally insufficient if the state’s
evidence is ‘inherently incredible,’” but “such doctrines are
exceedingly narrow—often looking only to whether a
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,
282 (1966) (emphasis added)).
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 Findley, supra note 2, at 602.
104 Roth, supra note 57, at 1673.
105 Id. at 1653–54.
106 Id. at 1652–53 & n.51; see also Findley, supra note 2, at 602.
107 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1282.
101
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witness’s testimony is contradictory or physically impossible,
without considering whether it is incredible by inference from
other evidence—and rarely to overturn a verdict.” 108 In the
end, the unspoken premise of the sufficiency standard is that
our jurors (and the witnesses on whose testimony they rely)
are free of bias—that almost every jury constitutes the
“rational trier of fact” that the Jackson standard venerates.
Part of that veneration lies in other ways our court system
accounts for biased jurors, lulling appellate courts into
accepting the false premise that the trier of fact was rational
and fair unless something overtly suggests otherwise. For
example, jury selection gives lawyers the opportunity to ask
jurors about their biases. But even the Supreme Court has
acknowledged it can “prove insufficient,” 109 and Sheri Lynn
Johnson calls it “largely ineffective for rooting out racial
bias.” 110 And the remedy of a mistrial for race-based exercises
of peremptory jury challenges, recognized in Batson v.
Kentucky, 111 “has proved erratic in terms of effectiveness
because the Court has simply failed to force rigorous
enforcement of the remedy in practice.” 112
Working against these protections is an almost-sacred rule
of evidence that precludes jurors from testifying about
improper behavior that occurs during deliberations. 113 In
keeping with that rule, “[m]ost state and federal courts . . .
will not allow evidence of racial bias to impeach a verdict.” 114
Roth, supra note 57, at 1653.
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).
110 Johnson, supra note 22, at 320.
111 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
112 J. Thomas Sullivan, Lethal Discrimination 2: Repairing the Remedies for
Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC
JUST. 113, 123 (2010).
113 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (“[A] juror may not testify about any
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's
deliberations . . . or any juror’s mental processes concerning the
verdict. . . .”); see also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861
(2017) (describing this “no-impeachment rule”).
114 Johnson, supra note 22, at 322–23.
108
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Only when “a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he
or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a
criminal defendant” does the rule give way to the
constitutional requirement of a fair trial, according to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado. 115
Even then, a court cannot learn about a juror’s resort to racial
stereotypes or animus unless another juror comes forward to
disclose it. 116 As Professor Robertson has argued, “invisible
error arises when improper jury decision-making hides
behind the shroud of rules protecting the jury’s deliberative
secrecy.” 117
So the Peña-Rodriguez standard “cannot remedy covert
bias.” 118 The operation of implicit biases is by definition
invisible; it will never involve a “clear statement” sufficient to
meet the Peña-Rodriguez standard. 119 As Professor Robertson
explains, bias can “fly under the radar, unapparent to the
judge or to the parties, but still influenc[e] the ultimate
verdict.” 120 Thus, nothing in an appellate court’s sufficiency
review will root out implicit bias; indeed, nothing in a
sufficiency review even looks for it. It assumes what we all
know is not reliably true: that juries are rational triers of fact,
barring something in the record overtly demonstrating the
contrary.
3. Sufficiency Review Also Falls Prey to Affirmation Bias.
A review for evidentiary sufficiency implicates yet
another implicit bias that makes the hill that much steeper for
a wrongfully convicted defendant: “the tendency to affirm a
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
Robertson, supra note 18, at 165 (noting that the issue arose in PeñaRodriguez “only because information about the jury’s deliberation was
later revealed”).
117 Id. at 163.
118 Robertson, supra note 18, at 192.
119 Johnson, supra note 22, at 279 (“we have very little insight into the
thought processes of the jurors”).
120 Robertson, supra note 18, at 192.
115
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prior decision for reasons unrelated to the relative merits of
the parties’ arguments or the applicable standard of
review.” 121 This affirmation bias “is likely to lead reviewing
courts—which begin with the knowledge that the defendant
has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—to
interpret information about the case in a manner that is
consistent with that conclusion.” 122 The psychology
underlying affirmation bias is not unique to appellate judges
or even to judges generally; “[a]ll other things being equal,
individuals tend to prefer an option that is consistent with the
status quo rather than one that requires change from the
status quo.” 123 But it has strong resonance in the appellatereview process because appellate judges understand that if
they reverse, “the trial judge may need to order a new trial or
additional hearings,” a consequence that may influence
affirmation bias in judges who “may not necessarily want to
create more work for other judges.” 124
Barry C. Edwards conducted a study designed to
determine the extent to which affirmation bias plays out in the
minds of appellate judges—giving his subjects a test case and
identifying the trial-court result for some subjects but not
others. 125 The results of his study “suggest[] that the
affirmation rate in appellate courts could be as much as 8%
higher than it should be due to a cognitive bias in favor of
affirming prior rulings.” 126 An earlier experiment by Chris
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich had
reached a similar conclusion. 127 Professor Edwards concluded
that “[e]very other factor thought to explain appellate court
Edwards, supra note 8, at 1043.
Findley, supra note 2, at 605–06.
123 Guthrie et al., supra note 8, at 377.
124 Edwards, supra note 8, at 1045.
125 Id. at 1036.
126 Id. at 1053.
127 Guthrie et al., supra note 7, at 26 (“Learning an outcome clearly
influenced the judges’ ex post assessments of the ex ante likelihood of
various possible outcomes. The intuitive notion that the past was
predictable prevailed.”).
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decision-making pales in comparison to how the case was
previously decided.” 128 In the end, “an appellate judge’s
knowledge of the trial judge’s original decision increases the
probability it is affirmed on appeal—regardless of what the
original decision was.” 129
It is no wonder, then, that sufficiency review has proven
to be an inadequate check against wrongful convictions.
Affirmation bias—layered atop implicit racial bias layered
atop the already-deferential Jackson standard—almost
ensures that sufficiency review will offer little meaningful
opportunity for a defendant to overturn a wrongful
conviction, even when that conviction was the product of
implicit bias.
C. Courts Have Failed to Exercise Adequately Their Power to
Reweigh Evidence
Because sufficiency review is by design the wrong vehicle
for addressing implicit bias in wrongful convictions, one
logically turns to a remedy in which the appellate court can
reweigh the evidence—that is, can assess not simply the
existence of evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict,
but instead its weight. Reviewing the weight of the evidence
“may suggest that the evidence, though legally sufficient, was
not enough to create confidence in the verdict.” 130
Edwards, supra note 8, at 1035.
Id. at 1036.
130 Robertson, supra note 18, at 198; see also Robertson, supra note 16, at
180 (“[T]he district court is permitted to make its own credibility
determinations; to view the evidence neutrally, instead of in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party; and to order a new trial if the jury’s
verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, even if a reasonable
jury could have returned the verdict.”). The difference between
sufficiency and weight of the evidence is an example of the difference
between what Luke Meier characterizes as the “probability” analysis and
the “confidence” analysis. Robertson, supra note 18, at 195 (citing Luke
Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the “Reasonable Jury” Standard, 84 Miss.
L.J. 747, 749–50 (2015)).
128
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When a court reviews the weight of the evidence, it sits “as
a ‘thirteenth juror’” that potentially “disagrees with the jury
verdict, thus creating a ‘hung’ jury and a need for retrial.” 131
The standard presumes evidentiary sufficiency; “[a] reversal
based on the weight of the evidence . . . can occur only after
the State both has presented sufficient evidence to support
conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict.” 132 So a
weight-of-the-evidence review by definition owes less (if any)
deference to the jury’s assessment of key aspects of the
evidence (such as credibility and cross-racial identification)
and, theoretically at least, could consider whether implicit
racial bias has played an improper role in the decision. The
remedy in these circumstances is not outright reversal, but
rather remand to the trial court for a new trial. That new trial,
in turn, poses no double-jeopardy problem, unlike a reversal
premised on evidentiary insufficiency. 133

Thomas S. Ginter, Weight Versus Sufficiency of Evidence: Tibbs v.
Florida, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 759, 773 (1983); see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S.
31, 43 (1982) (“The reversal simply affords the defendant a second
opportunity to seek a favorable judgment.”); Michael Seward, Case
Comment, The Sufficiency-Weight Distinction—A Matter of Life or Death, 38
U. MIAMI L. REV. 147, 154 (1983) (“In reversing a conviction upon a verdict
contrary to the weight of the evidence, a court acts as a member of the jury,
casting its own vote.”). Pennsylvania has rejected the “thirteenth juror”
terminology, explaining that the judge evaluating evidentiary weight has
powers more limited than the jury’s. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744
A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. 2000) (“Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth
juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that
‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight
that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to
deny justice.’” (quoting Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 493 A.2d 669,
674 (1985)).
132 Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42–43.
133 Id. at 42 (analogizing manifest-weight reversal to “[a] deadlocked
jury,” which “we consistently have recognized, does not result in an
acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). But see
People v. Romero, 859 N.E.2d 902, 909 n.2 (N.Y. 2006) (explaining that,
under New York statutory law, a defendant cannot be retried following a
131
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With that backdrop, I turn now to the reception that
manifest-weight review has received in both trial and
appellate courts following criminal convictions. That
reception has been limited, if not downright hostile.
1. Trial Courts Rarely Grant New Trials Based on
Evidentiary Weight
a. Trial Courts Have the Power
In the federal system, trial courts have always enjoyed the
power to review a jury’s verdict and to order a new trial if the
verdict runs against the weight of the evidence. From the
founding, trial courts could grant new-trial motions
“whenever it appears with a reasonable certainty, that . . . the
jury have proceeded . . . contrary to strong evidence.” 134 The
current authority for doing so resides in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which “authorize a district judge to
grant a new trial when ‘the interest of justice so requires.’” 135
The availability of a new trial in state court based on weight
of the evidence is, of course, a function of state law as to which
the rules vary from state to state. 136
In jurisdictions that permit trial courts to order a new trial
based on evidentiary weight, the court need not defer to the
jury’s credibility determinations, even when they can be
inferred from the verdict. “The vast majority of courts that
have considered the issue agree that the trial judge should be
permitted to make an independent assessment of witness
credibility in determining whether the jury’s verdict is against

reversal on weight of the evidence (citing N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.20(5)
(McKinney 2009)).
134 Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 55, 56 (1790); see also Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 14 (1899) (trial judge empowered “to set
aside [jury] verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against . . . the evidence”).
135 Robertson, supra note 18, at 173 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 33).
136 See, e.g., In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 539 A.2d 664, 684–86
(Md. 1988) (surveying various state jurisdictions).
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the great weight of the evidence.” 137 Professor Robertson
points out that credibility assessment is critical to a trial
court’s weight-of-the-evidence review; “[i]f the trial court
were not allowed to consider credibility, then direct evidence
would always pass the weight-of-the-evidence test, just as it
always passes the sufficiency test . . . .” 138
At first blush, a trial court’s weight-of-the-evidence
review can appear to usurp the jury’s role in settling
disputes. 139 But Professors Robertson and Findley have
supplied the answers to that concern. The first is that “the
judge is actually playing a very different role” from the jury:
[T]he judge and jury are both given the
opportunity to exercise their complementary
strengths: for the jury, this is the power of group
decision-making, the greater diversity of its
members, and a more accurate reflection of the
community. The judge, on the other hand, has
greater experience with a range of cases and an
Id. at 180–81; see also United States v. Crittenden, 971 F.3d 499, 506
(5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court may grant a new trial even where ‘the
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction,’ if, upon ‘cautiously
reweigh[ing] it,’ the district court concludes that the evidence
‘preponderate[s] heavily against the guilty verdict.’” (quoting United
States v. Herrera, 559 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added by
Crittenden court)), vacated on other grounds, 971 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 2020).
138 Robertson, supra note 16, at 211.
139 The Sixth Circuit explained this concern in Holmes v. City of
Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041 (6th Cir. 1996):
“Where no undesirable or pernicious element has
occurred or been introduced into the trial and the trial
judge nonetheless grants a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the
trial judge in negating the jury’s verdict has, to some
extent at least, substituted his judgment of the facts and
the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury. Such
an action effects a denigration of the jury system and to
the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes over,
if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the
trier of the facts.”
Id. at 1047 (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 377 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1967)).
137
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understanding of how the facts and the law
interrelate in the case, giving the judge an
intuitive sense of when the jury might have
misunderstood the court’s instructions even
when the judge cannot directly inquire into the
basis of the jury’s decision. 140
The judge’s power is thus “a ‘safety valve’ for the jury, rather
than a usurpation of its essential function.” 141 This view of the
judge-jury power allocation suggests correctly (and in
keeping with the jury’s historical role 142) that jury verdicts are
not so immune from scrutiny as conventional wisdom often
supposes. The second answer to the usurpation concern is
that rejecting a jury’s verdict does not result in an acquittal; it
merely requires the case to proceed to a second trial, where a
jury will still render the ultimate verdict. 143
Moreover, unlike civil cases, which are subject to a
constitutional bar against judicial reexamination of jury
verdicts under the Seventh Amendment, 144 the “Sixth
Amendment poses no barrier to review of guilty verdicts
because the right to a jury trial is a criminal defendant's
alone.” 145 Our cultural fixation on jury-trial rights is based on
the notion that “juries provide ‘an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
Robertson, supra note 16, at 200 (footnotes omitted).
Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV. 435, 488
(2013) (quoting Robertson, supra note 18, at 177); see also Findley, supra
note 2, at 619 (““For centuries, eminent authorities have argued that the
judicial authority to overturn verdicts and grant a new trial before a new
jury is an important safeguard that protects the jury trial right.”); James D.
Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 459,
475 (1975) (“[T]the power to reverse in the interest of justice is more in the
nature of a safety valve, seldom used when the system is working
satisfactorily, rather than a short circuit [that] disrupts the system.”).
142 See id. at 489 & n.371.
143 Id. at 488 & n.367 (citing Robertson, supra note 16, at 205).
144 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see generally Robertson, supra note 16, at
189–93.
145 Findley, supra note 2, at 619.
140
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complaint, biased, or eccentric judge.’” 146 A judge’s rejection
of a guilty verdict is in perfect harmony with that underlying
purpose.
For the same reason, the subsequent retrial poses no
double-jeopardy concerns. “[A] new trial is beneficial to the
defendant—despite evidence sufficient to support a
conviction, the defendant is given another opportunity to win
acquittal.” 147 Retrial after reversal in a manifest-weight
challenge is “not so much a second jeopardy, but rather a
second opportunity for a jury to find the defendant
innocent,” 148 akin to a deadlocked jury (with the judge serving
as the holdout). 149
b. Trial Courts Are Reluctant to Invoke the Power in
Criminal Cases
Despite the established procedure for reweighing
evidence, trial courts have not “commonly invoked” that
power in criminal cases—where it the need is greatest—“and
in many states it was either never recognized or was
abolished altogether.” 150 Even where the power exists,
“judges hardly ever revisit jurors’ credibility findings or
decisions about what weight to give testimonial evidence in
relation to other evidence of guilt or innocence, even when a
defendant’s liberty is at stake.” 151 Professor Robertson argues
that “the trial judge’s power to review evidentiary weight
remains significantly undervalued in the contemporary era of
the vanishing trial.” 152

George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries, and
Jeopardy, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
147 Seward, supra note 131, at 156.
148 Ginter, supra note 131, at 776.
149 See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982).
150 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1315.
151 Roth, supra note 57, at 1653 (footnotes omitted).
152 Robertson, supra note 18, at 168.
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Doctrinally, “the standards by which judges weigh the
evidence and determine when to grant a new trial are chaotic
and inconsistent.” 153 That “doctrinal confusion . . . hinders the
administration of justice and gives rise to systemic procedural
inequalities.” 154 Even when established doctrine provides
guidance, it urges “caution when reweighing evidence.” 155 So
trial courts “couch their decisions in terms of ‘exceptional
cases,’ ‘preventing injustice,’ or the ‘evidence preponderating
heavily against the verdict.’” 156 Those standards are too high
to satisfy meaningfully the main purpose of a weight-of-theevidence review: to order a new trial when a jury reaches an
erroneous verdict. 157
2. Appellate Courts Have Limited Power
If trial courts fail to offer wrongfully convicted defendants
meaningful weight-of-evidence review, the next logical
question is whether appellate courts step in to fill the void.
They don’t. Instead, appellate courts are confused about their
standard of review but in general are overly deferential to
trial-court decisions that deny new-trial motions. More
broadly, appellate courts have no power of direct review over
jury verdicts, except in a handful of jurisdictions where the
power is not robust enough to solve the problem.

Id. at 171; see also id. Robertson, supra note 16, at 201 (“[T]his is an
area of law that is rarely discussed and often confused.”).
154 Robertson, supra note 18, at 179.
155 Seward, supra note 131, at 154.
156 Id. at 155 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting United States v. Pepe,
209 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D. Del. 1962), aff’d, 339 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1964); then
quoting United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 618 (D. Haw. 1949); and
then quoting United States v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (D.D.C.
1947))).
157 Robertson, supra note 16, at 188 (“If the rule authorizing new trials
on the weight of the evidence is not to be superfluous, then the standard
for granting a new trial cannot be as strict as the standard for granting
judgment as a matter of law.”).
153
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a. Appellate Courts Apply a Deferential, Abuse-ofDiscretion Standard of Review to Trial-Court
Orders Denying New Trials.
Appellate courts reviewing trial-court rulings on weight
of the evidence have further confused and eroded the
remedy. 158 Professor Robertson notes that “[t]he doctrinal
confusion . . . hinders the administration of justice and gives
rise to systemic procedural inequalities.” 159 The Supreme
Court was skeptical of the appellate court’s power to do
anything more than evaluate the trial judge’s exercise of
discretion, at least in civil cases. 160 Commentators and courts
have also expressed institutional concerns with permitting
the appellate court to substitute its judgment not only for the
jury, but also for the trial-court judge. 161
Robertson, supra note 16, at 201 (““[T]his is an area of law that is
rarely discussed and often confused.”); Albert Tate, Jr., “Manifest Error”—
Further Observations on Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 22
LA. L. REV. 605, 606 (1962) (“[A]ppellate judges do have differing views
among themselves as to the proper weight to attach to trial court
determinations of the facts . . . .”).
159 Robertson, supra note 18, at 179.
160 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996)
(“[T]he Seventh Amendment restricted the court of appeals to ruling only
on whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial.”);
see also Robertson, supra note 16, at 191. But the Seventh Amendment
concerns that animate the reluctance in civil cases do not have sway in
criminal cases. See supra notes 144–146 and accompanying text.
161 See, e.g., 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & MARY KAY
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2819, at 261 (3d ed.
2012) (“To allow appellate review of the denial of the new-trial motion
would mean that the verdict could be set aside solely by judges who were
not present at the trial even though the trial judge has found that the
verdict is not against the clear weight of the evidence.”); see also Robertson,
supra note 16, at 193–94 (Gasperini requires “the trial court [to] take
primary responsibility for reviewing the weight of the evidence.”); People
v. Lemmon, 576 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Mich. 1998) (“Appellate reluctance to
interfere with the grant of a new trial is soundly rooted in the proposition
that “[t]he judge was “there.” We were not.’” (quoting Alder v. Flint City
Coach Lines, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. 1961) (Black, J.,
concurring))).
158
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So when a trial court denies a defendant’s request to order
a new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds, the
opportunity for justice on appeal is “even more diluted
because the court is called upon to defer to the trial court’s
decision and reverse only for abuse of discretion. By this time,
the soup is too thin to contain much nourishment at all.” 162
And most appellate courts have “adopted the view that they
must scrutinize decisions granting new trials more closely”
than decisions denying them; the Second Circuit, for example,
“will not review the denial of a new trial on weight of the
evidence grounds at all.” 163 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits call
a district court’s denial of a motion for new trial “’virtually
unassailable.’” 164 Appellate courts are thus “willing to accept
a greater degree of error in denying a new trial than in
granting one” 165—precisely the opposite of the approach that
would help remediate the wrongful-conviction rate.
b. Appellate Courts, with Rare Exceptions, Undertake
No Independent Review of the Weight of the
Evidence.
Not only do appellate courts apply minimal scrutiny to
trial-court orders denying new trials, they also almost
162 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1315 (footnote omitted); see also Tate, supra
note 158, at 605 (“[A] trial court’s factual determinations should not be
disturbed upon review in the absence of ‘manifest error.’” (quoting David
W. Robertson, Comment, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases,
21 LOUISIANA L. REV. 402, 402 (1961))).
163 Robertson, supra note 16, at 194; see also State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d
119, 123 (Tenn. 1995) (“An appellate court may presume that the trial court
has acted as the thirteenth juror and approved the jury’s verdict where the
trial court simply overrules a motion for new trial without any explicit
statement that it has independently weighed the evidence and agrees with
the jury's verdict.”).
164 Franks v. Kirk, 804 Fed. App’x 610, 611 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, (9th Cir. 2010)); White Commc'ns, LLC v.
Synergies3 Tec Servs., LLC, 4 F.4th 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Batiste-Davis v. Lincare, Inc., 526 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 2008)).
165 Robertson, supra note 16, at 203.
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universally lack any power to review the weight of the
evidence independently. 166 A student commentator argued in
1983 that appellate courts should have and should exercise
the power to reverse judgments, including convictions, when
they disagree with the jury’s resolution of the evidence but
concede that the evidence was legally sufficient. 167 But forty
years later, even after others scholars have joined the cry, 168
most states have no law on the subject, and a few specify that
appellate review of evidentiary weight is not available at all. 169
Appellate relief on evidentiary weight was once available in
Mississippi, Texas, and Florida, but all three states have now
eliminated it—Mississippi with essentially no analysis and
Texas and Florida with tortured history. 170
New York, Ohio and Illinois stand out as the only three
states that permit appellate review of the weight of the
evidence (and not simply review of a trial-court order on the
question), 171 but only Ohio has a robust body of law on the
The appellate court, like the trial court, sits as the “thirteenth juror”
when reversing a judgment on the weight of the evidence. See Ginter, supra
note 131, at 760 (““[A] reversal based on the weight of the evidence means
only that the appellate court, sitting as the ‘thirteenth juror,’ disagrees
with the jury’s evaluation of the conflicting testimony.”).
167 Seward, supra note 131, at 163 (“To prevent . . . injustice, it is
suggested that all states should allow their appellate courts to reweigh
evidence.”).
168 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., State v. Brown, No. A05-2418, 2007 WL 46063, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2007); State v. Bembenek, 331 N.W.2d 616 (Wis. Ct. App.
1983); see also Robertson, supra note 18, at 184 (“[W]ith regard to new trials
on the weight of the evidence, there has been no push for convergence
among the states.”).
170 See Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, ¶ 20 (Miss. 2017); Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2010); Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120
(Fla. 1981), aff’d, 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
171 See, e.g., State v. Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d 541, 546 (Ohio 1994);
People v. Nicholls, 245 N.E.2d 771, 774–75 (Ill. 1969). The right to weightof-the-evidence appellate review in New York is statutory and has
received only scant discussion in the case law. See People v. Cahill, 809
N.E.2d 561, 583–84 (N.Y. 2003) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.15(5)
(McKinney 2009)).
166
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subject. Even in Ohio, manifest-weight relief is constrained by
both the language courts use in describing their charge and in
a unique requirement of panel unanimity.
i. The Tortured History in Texas and Florida
(a) Texas Says Yes, Then Says No
The Texas experience is illustrative of both the hostility
appellate courts have expressed toward reviewing
evidentiary weight and the confusion and disagreement
among appellate judges on the question. Until 2010, appellate
courts in Texas had the power to reverse a case under a
“factual-sufficiency standard,” as distinguished from the
“legal-sufficiency standard” mandated by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jackson v. Virginia. 172 The difference
between the two was that “the reviewing court [was] required
to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations . . .
under a legal-sufficiency standard while it [was] not required
to defer to a jury’s credibility and weight determinations . . .
under a factual-sufficiency standard.” 173
Despite that difference, Texas courts had continued to
adhere to a contrary maxim, even in the factual-sufficiency
context, that an appellate judge should not reverse “’simply
because, on the quantum of evidence admitted, he would
have voted to acquit had he been on the jury.’” 174 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, in a sharply divided five-to-four
decision, acknowledged in 2010 that these two principles
were “inconsistent.” 175 But, rather than clarifying the
appellate court’s power to order a new trial if the appellate
judges disagreed with the jury’s verdict, a plurality of the
172 See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894–95 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979)), overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
1996); see also supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
173 Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899–900.
174 Id. at 901 (quoting Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Ct.
Crim. App. 2006)).
175 Id.
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court elected instead to resolve the inconsistency by
eliminating factual-sufficiency (that is, weight-of-theevidence) review altogether. 176
In reaching that decision, the plurality dismissively
rejected the notion that a factual-sufficiency review was
necessary to respond to “[s]ome [w]idespread [c]riminal
[j]ustice [p]roblem.” 177 The court insisted that review under
the legal-sufficiency standard was adequate. It offered a
single example to prove the point:
The store clerk at trial identifies A as the
robber. A properly authenticated surveillance
videotape of the event clearly shows that B
committed the robbery. But, the jury convicts A.
It was within the jury's prerogative to believe
the convenience store clerk and disregard the
video. But based on all the evidence the jury's
finding of guilt is not a rational finding. 178
This example is shockingly simplistic. It does no more than
establish that a legal-sufficiency review can reject a jury’s
finding when irrefutable evidence demonstrates the finding
was wrong. But it does nothing to address conflicts in witness
testimony, where the dangers of implicit bias are most
prevalent. 179
Four judges on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
dissented and would have retained factual-sufficiency
review. 180 They pointed to the factual-sufficiency standard,
which requires the appellate court, before ordering a new
Id. at 905 (“[T]he only way to retain a factual-sufficiency standard,
which would be meaningfully distinct from a Jackson v. Virginia legalsufficiency standard, would be to allow reviewing courts to sit as
‘thirteenth jurors.’ However, our factual-sufficiency decisions have
consistently declined to do this.”); see also id at 926 (Cochran, J.,
concurring) (“Appellate courts must defer to [the jury’s] credibility
assessments . . . .”).
177 Id. at 906.
178 Id. at 907.
179 See supra notes 50–63 and accompanying text.
180 Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 926–32 (Price, J., dissenting).
176
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trial, to “say, with some objective basis in the record, that the
jury’s verdict, while legally sufficient, is nevertheless against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, and
therefore ‘manifestly unjust.’” 181 They argued that the
“manifestly unjust” standard does not permit the appellate
court to order a new trial merely because it disagrees with the
jury’s verdict, as the plurality held. Instead, the factualsufficiency standard permitted reversal only in rare cases,
when “the State's evidence is intolerably tenuous or [when]
the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.” 182
But the dissenters did not prevail, and the Texas courts no
longer permit weight-of-the-evidence reviews in criminal
appeals. One student commentator, demonstrating rhetorical
restraint, observed that “eliminating the standard does not
further the goals of Texas criminal courts to exonerate the
innocent.” 183 Despite the court’s dismissive language, there is
a widespread criminal-justice problem, and Texas has turned
a blind eye to it, at least in the context of weight-of-theevidence review.
(b) Florida Says No and Prompts the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Seminal Decision on the
Subject
Unlike Texas, Florida law was never clear on the
availability of weight-of-the-evidence review on appeal. But
in 1981, the Supreme Court of Florida shut the door
definitively in Tibbs v. State: weight-of-the-evidence review,
“if ever valid in Florida, should now be eliminated from
Florida law. Henceforth, no appellate court should reverse a
conviction or judgment on the ground that the weight of the
181 Id. at 928 (quoting Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. Ct.
Crim. App. 2006)).
182 Id. at 929 (emphasis added).
183 Jason Hanna, Comment, Brooks v. State, the Standard Was Raised,
but the Bar Was Lowered: If Texas Appellate Courts Cannot Protect the Accused,
Who Will?, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 373, 407 (2013).
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evidence is tenuous or insubstantial.” 184 Ironically, despite
rejecting weight-of-the-evidence review, the Supreme Court
of Florida’s decision in Tibbs led to the United States Supreme
Court’s only decision on the subject, giving life to the
“thirteenth juror” nomenclature and clarifying that doublejeopardy concerns to not bar retrial after a manifest-weight
reversal. 185 But the Supreme Court took no position on
whether the remedy should or should not be available, in
either state or federal court.
In doing away with manifest-weight review, the Florida
Tibbs court articulated four policy justifications, but none is
compelling. First, the court saw value in “leaving questions of
weight for resolution only before the trier of fact”; 186 I address
this institutional-competency concern below. 187 Second, the
court sought to “avoid disparate appellate results” that it
feared would be the product of endorsing weight-of-theevidence review. 188 But disparate results are an acceptable
product of different evidentiary records in trial proceedings,
just as different juries reach different conclusions in different
cases. Third, the court did not want to perpetuate two levels
of evidentiary review (sufficiency and weight) that appellate
courts conflate 189—a concern more properly directed to the

184

(1982).

Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1125 (Fla. 1981), aff’d, 457 U.S. 31

See Tibbs, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982); see also supra note 17 and
accompanying text. The double-jeopardy question reached the United
States Supreme Court, despite the Supreme Court of Florida’s rejection of
weight-of-the-evidence review on appeal, because the latter court had
reversed the defendant’s convictions on weight-of-the- evidence grounds
in an earlier decision. See Tibbs, 397 So. 2d at 1126.
186 Tibbs, 397 So. 2d at 1125.
187 See infra notes 220–236 and accompanying text.
188 Id.
189 Id. (expressing concern about having to review appellate reversals
to determine if they “were based on sufficiency or on weight.”). Ironically,
it was the Supreme Court of Florida itself—and not the lower courts—that
created confusion in Tibbs about whether the earlier reversal of his
conviction was on sufficiency or weight grounds. See id. at 1122 (“We are
185
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quality of judging and opinion writing than to the law itself.
The fourth concern was designed to protect defendants: the
Tibbs court wanted to ensure that appellate courts would
reverse on sufficiency grounds when warranted, rather than
give in to the “temptation” invoke manifest-weight reversal
as a pretext for ordering a retrial (a retrial that reversal on
sufficiency grounds would not permit). 190 But the court
ignored the corollary effect on wrongfully convicted
defendants against whom the evidence passes a sufficiency
test; its holding strips them of the only other nonprocedural
recourse on appeal.
The Tibbs court, unlike the Texas court three decades later,
was unanimous in its rejection of manifest-weight review.
One concurring justice went further then the majority, finding
“no legal justification for such a procedure.” 191
ii. The Robust Law Governing Manifest-Weight
Review on Appeal in Ohio.
Ohio is the state with the largest volume of decisional law
addressing manifest-weight review on appeal. 192 That volume
comes as no surprise; the Supreme Court of Ohio has
repeatedly affirmed that the right to a manifest-weight review
on appeal is available on appeal in Ohio 193 and is distinct from
asked by Tibbs to rule that our reversal of his original convictions was
based on evidentiary insufficiency, not evidentiary weight.”).
190 Id. at 1125–26; see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 50–51 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting) (expressing same concern).
191 Id. at 1127 (Sundberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 A search for “manifest weight” on Westlaw confined to Ohio courts
yields 10,000 results, which appears to be Westlaw’s upper limit. See AMY
E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES 233 (8th ed.
2021).
193 See Eastley v. Volkman, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 7 (Ohio 2012) (“There
should be no question that a court of appeals has the authority to reverse
a judgment as being against the weight of the evidence.”); see also State v.
Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ohio 1994). The right in Ohio emanates
in part from a unique constitutional provision: “No judgment resulting
from a trial by jury shall be reversed on the weight of the evidence except

THE APPELLATE JUDGE AS THE THIRTEENTH JUROR:
COMBATTING IMPLICIT BIAS IN CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

40

a sufficiency review. 194 The review is available in appeals from
both jury trials and bench trials. 195
Ohio has clarified both the nature of a manifest-weight
review and an important procedural distinction that applies
to it. As to nature, the appellate court “‘weighs the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
[judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” 196 As
to the procedural distinction, there is no predicate
requirement that the appellant first move for a new trial in the
trial court; the appellate court can address the evidentiaryweight question whether or not the trial court has done so,
even after a jury trial. 197 So appellate courts in Ohio are
empowered to play a primary role in the process of reweighing

by the concurrence of all three judges hearing the cause.” OHIO CONST.
art. iv, § 3(B)(3). While that provision imposes “a limitation on the power
of a court of appeals” rather than confer the underlying right, see
Thompkins, 683 N.E.2d at 548, there is no doubt that the underlying right—
whether its source is textual or inferential—is entrenched in Ohio
appellate law.
194 See Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d at 386 (“The legal concepts of sufficiency
of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and
qualitatively different.”); Eastley, 972 N.E.2d 517, at ¶ 9 (same).
195 See OHIO R. APP. P. 12(C). In civil cases tried to a judge, an appellate
court reversing on manifest-weight grounds has the option of ordering a
new trial or weighing the evidence itself. OHIO R. APP. P. 12(C)(1). In a civil
case tried to a jury, the only relief the appellate court may order following
a manifest-weight reversal is a new trial. OHIO R. APP. P. 12(C)(2).
Interestingly, Ohio’s appellate rules do not mention manifest-weight
reversal in criminal cases.
196 Eastley, 972 N.E.2d 517, at ¶ 20 (quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 750
N.E.2d 176, 185 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d at
547 (quoting State v. Martin, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–21 (Ohio Ct. App.
1983)))) (alterations added by Tewarson court).
197 Id. at ¶ 29 (“Nothing in the rules or statutes requires a party to have
made a particular motion before seeking appellate review of a jury verdict
on the weight of the evidence.”).
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evidence, not simply the role of reviewing a trial court’s grant
or denial of a motion for a new trial. 198
Still, that power is more limited than the jury’s power to
decide the case in the first instance. The review occurs “’not
in the substantially unlimited sense that such weight and
credibility are passed on originally by the jury[,] but in the
more restricted sense of whether it appears to the trial court
that manifest injustice has been done and that the verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.’” 199 So there
remains a “presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” 200
Indeed, “’every reasonable intendment and every reasonable
presumption must be made in favor of the judgment,’” and
“’[i]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one
construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that
interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and
judgment . . . .’” 201 There is even a strand of case law in Ohio
that suggests deference to the jury’s credibility
determinations. 202
It bears emphasis, too, that a manifest-weight reversal in
Ohio requires all three appellate judges to concur in overturning
Cf. supra notes 160–165 and accompanying text.
Eastley, 972 N.E.2d 517, at ¶ 27 (quoting Rohde v. Farmer, 262
N.E.2d 685, 686 (Ohio 1970)).
200 Id. at ¶ 21.
201 Id. (quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. City of Cleveland, 461 N.E.2d 1273,
1276 n.3 (Ohio 1984) (quoting 5 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE 3d § 603, at 191–92
(1978))).
202 See MARK P. PAINTER & ANDREW S. POLLIS, OHIO APPELLATE
PRACTICE § 7:22, at 374 (2021–22 ed.) (“The law is currently muddled on
the extent to which the appellate court independently evaluates witness
credibility when performing a manifest-weight challenge.”). The
explanation for this anomalous strand of law is “the misplaced reliance”
on an Ohio Supreme Court decision that discusses credibility in the
context sufficiency review, not manifest-weight review. Id. (citing State v.
DeHass, 227 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1967)). A recent example is in State v.
Pittman, 2022-Ohio-300, ¶ 45 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) (citing DeHass for the
proposition that “in a manifest-weight review, the weight to be given the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the finder
of fact.”).
198
199
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a jury verdict. 203 By contrast, in reviewing any other claim of
error, only two out of three panelists must concur. 204 So Ohio,
unlike almost every other state, offers an appellate remedy
that has the theoretical capacity to address implicit bias, even
where the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. But
the unanimity requirement imposes a higher hurdle for
reversal than would apply to any other type of error. A central
rationale for the higher barrier “is to preserve the jury's role
with respect to issues surrounding the credibility of
witnesses,” 205 a concern also reflected in the substantive
standard. 206
III.

INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCIES:
COMPARATIVE
MANIFEST-WEIGHT REVIEW ON APPEAL DOES NOT
UNDERMINE THE JURY SYSTEM.

The scholarly and judicial literature is replete with
statements elevating the jury’s competency to evaluate factual
issues, including witness credibility, and privileging jury fact
finding over fact finding by appellate courts. “Notions of
relative institutional competence form the grounds on which
justifications of appellate deference to trial-level fact finding
are almost universally formulated.” 207 Perhaps the strongest
argument against manifest-weight review on appeal is the
concern that it degrades the jury system and the historical
deference our legal system has always conferred on juries to
resolve factual disputes. Indeed, the very notion that an
appellate court can root out implicit bias in jury verdicts

203 OHIO CONST. art. iv, § 3(B)(3); see also State v. Thompkins, 678
N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ohio 1994).
204 OHIO CONST. art. iv, § 3(B)(3) (“A majority of the judges hearing the
cause shall be necessary to render a judgment.”).
205 Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d at 548.
206 See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
207 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 444–45.
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strikes at the heart of that deference 208 and suggests a step
away from an adjudicative system that places so much trust
and power in the hands of “ordinary citizens.” 209
But on closer examination, these concerns dissolve.
Instead, manifest-weight review can work in perfect harmony
with the jury system while maximizing the appellate court’s
ability to review the record of a trial with a degree of greater
acuity that is inherently lacking in the trial process. There are
several interrelated considerations that prove this point.
A. There Is No Value in Deferring to a Guilty Verdict Tainted
by Implicit Bias
As a threshold matter, we start with a self-evident maxim:
a jury verdict infected by implicit racial bias—especially in a
criminal case—should enjoy no reverence. But that selfevident maxim is actually a departure from longstanding
principles of appellate review. “[T]he standards governing
challenges to general verdicts are exceedingly deferential,
focusing only on what a hypothetical jury could have found,
rather than on what the actual jury did find.” 210 So instead of
Tate, supra note 158, at 607 (arguing that appellate courts engage in
“primarily the review” of trial-court determinations, “not an independent
redetermination in which the trial court finding is assigned no weight.”).
209 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (“The opportunity for
ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long
been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury
system.”).
210 Charles Eric Hintz, Fair Questions: A Call and Proposal for Using
General Verdicts with Special Interrogatories to Prevent Biased and Unjust
Convictions, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 43, 53 (2021). Appellate judges
have historically expressed the same deference when describing the
process of reviewing a trial judge’s factual findings. See generally Tate,
supra note 158, at 608-09 (“[T]he appellate judge should . . . rule out every
reasonable construction of the evidence [that] supports the trial
determination; reversal should not be recommended simply because the
appellate judge might have himself decided the case differently by
construing the evidence differently than did the trial court.”); id. at 614
(deference is warranted “not only because as a practical matter the trial
judge is in a better position than [are] his appellate brethren to evaluate
208
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ensuring a review process that lends itself to rooting out
convictions influenced by implicit bias, appellate courts
afford “rather extreme deference” to jury verdicts. 211 The
“usual surface justification” for doing so “vests the jury with
plenary authority on the judgment of witness veracity
because of the jurors’ opportunity to observe demeanor
during testimony.” 212
That surface justification has its appeal; “[w]ithout
epistemic access to truth, or any readily apparent way to
apply standards and principles to the case-specific
determinations about truth and veracity, appellate courts
naturally prefer to defer to those deemed better positioned to
make such judgments.” 213 But deeming the jury better
positioned to make those judgments may be more about
“creat[ing] confidence that the system is accurately
determining guilt and innocence” than about “whether it
really is.” 214 And the intolerably high wrongful-conviction
rate 215 exposes that the confidence is unwarranted. So the
argument that the jury is better positioned to decide the facts
“is becoming increasingly less tenable as a justification.” 216
It is fair to ask how we can know when bias has played a
role in a conviction, thus justifying a departure from the
tradition of jury deference. As Professor Robertson
acknowledges, “in many cases there may be no ‘extrinsic
indication of bias’ but only a verdict that appears not to
comport with the great weight of the evidence.” 217 Given the
the credibility of witnesses,” but “also because the proper and efficient
operation of our judicial system allots factual determinations primarily to
the trial judge and only secondarily to the appellate court, and because the
public interest in the swift and authoritative settlement of disputes at law
requires it”).
211 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1314; see also Findley, supra note 2, at 607.
212 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1314.
213 Findley, supra note 2, at 607.
214 See id.
215 See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.
216 Findley, supra note 2, at 608.
217 Robertson, supra note 16, at 205.
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consequences of a wrongful conviction, that assessment
should be enough to warrant a new trial. 218 If the record
permits a reasonable debate about whether bias played a role,
we should assume it did. 219
B. Research Refutes the Underlying Premise that Juries Are
Better Positioned to Judge Witness Credibility
The deference to juror factfinding has its roots in the
premise that “the face and talk and appearance of many
persons, and probably of most people, is a fairly accurate
approximate guide to their personality and character” 220 and
that “[t]he fact finder . . . enjoys an advantage over appellate
courts in that it experiences the introduction of evidence and
testimony as it happens.” 221 So the law has long assumed that
jurors, watching witnesses testify live in the courtroom, are
more competent at assessing credibility than appellate judges
whose access to the testimony consists only of a “cold” paper
record 222 that “inevitably must give an incomplete and
sometimes distorted picture of the case.” 223
Id. (“Allowing the court to order a new trial on the weight of the
evidence may therefore correct biased or otherwise improper jury verdicts
even when it is not clear why the jury entered the verdict that it did.”)
(footnote omitted).
219 See infra notes 299–311 and accompanying text.
220 Tate, supra note 158, at 613.
221 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 440.
222 Id. at 446; see also id. at 439 (describing conventional view that
“appellate courts are not very good at fact finding” because “appellate
judges are not present in the courtroom to witness testimony and evidence
firsthand.”).
223 LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 85
(1939); see also Adam N. Steinman, Rethinking Standard of Appellate Review,
96 IND. L.J. 1, 16 (2020) (“[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that trial
courts have an advantage when evaluating the credibility of live witness
testimony because ‘the various cues that “bear so heavily on the listener's
understanding of and belief in what is said” are lost on an appellate court
later sifting through a paper record.’” (quoting Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455, 1474 (2017) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575
(1985))).
218
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But “the conventional wisdom” about jurors’ institutional
competency “is misguided.” 224 Research has more recently
shown that “people consistently perform poorly at using
demeanor evidence to assess credibility and veracity, such
that much of the information traditionally thought to provide
the jury with a fact-finding advantage may actually operate
to mislead.” 225 In short, “social science has debunked the
theory that humans accurately judge credibility based on
demeanor.” 226 Worse yet, “[w]hen the speaker and observer
are of different races or cultures, even more opportunities for
mistranslation may exist, since behavioral cues thought to
signal sincerity in one culture may be taken as signs of
deception by members of another culture.” 227
So it turns out that “there are fundamental respects in
which appellate courts can function as superior fact
finders.” 228 Indeed, the appellate court’s “recourse only to a
transcript provides . . . certain advantages.” 229 It is a “less
ephemeral mode of communication” that can be “reread and
reconsidered,” 230 permitting “a cohesive narrative, organized
chronologically or along some other logical organizing
scheme.” 231 And, where implicit bias is at work, “[t]hought
Oldfather, supra note 10, at 445.
Id. at 440; see also Findley, supra note 2, at 627 (“Demeanor evidence,
to the extent it is useful for assessing credibility, is useless, or worse, when
it comes to assessing eyewitness testimony.”); Roth, supra note 57, at 1647
(“[J]urors are not particularly good at determining credibility or weighing
evidence . . . .”).
226 Roth, supra note 57, at 1656; see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 1258
(“Although jurors serve as the chief lie detectors during trial, studies
demonstrate that jurors, like other people, are not very good at lie
detection.”); Findley, supra note 2, at 621 (“Empirical research shows that
people—including professional fact finders like police officers and
judges—are simply not good at using demeanor to assess veracity.”).
227 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 458.
228 Id. at 440; see also Findley, supra note 2, at 623 (“[A]ppellate courts
have one other advantage over juries: experience and perspective.”).
229 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 440.
230 Id. at 455; see also Findley, supra note 2, at 622 (same).
231 Findley, supra note 2, at 620.
224
225
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processes based on information from a textual source are
more compatible with systematic, rational (and therefore
‘legal’) thought than are those based on information received
orally.” 232 In other words, adjudicating facts based on a
transcript actually facilitates the exercise of deliberative
(System 2) thinking. 233
But the law has not caught up with the science; “the
system’s promotion of the idea that ‘lie detecting is what our
juries do best’ has largely worked ” 234 and remains intact even
though “the cover has been blown on the jury.” 235 The judicial
system continues its entrenched practice of “inappropriately
insulating jury verdicts of guilt from review because of
excessive deference to the jury’s evaluation of live
testimony.” 236 And when implicit bias has exacted its
influence on that evaluation, that deference is antithetical to
meaningful appellate review.
C. Appellate Review of Jury Verdicts Need Not Supplant the
Jury’s Traditional Fact-Finding Role
Traditional notions of power delegation may at first blush
suggest a conflict when courts step beyond notions of
sufficiency and entertain questions of evidentiary weight that
juries normally answer. 237 But Professor Robertson argues
that manifest-weight review can co-exist with the jury’s
traditional fact-finding role and that there is no conflict;
Oldfather, supra note 10, at 440; see also Robertson, supra note 16, at
215 (“The appellate court may also have more time for ‘research and
deliberation’ and need not make quick rulings during the heat of trial.”
(quoting Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747,
757 (1982))).
233 See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
234 Roth, supra note 57, at 1654 (footnotes omitted).
235 Id. at 1656.
236 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1282.
237 See Ginter, supra note 131, at 761 (“Consideration of the weight of
the evidence allows an appellate court to possess some dominion over the
jury . . . .”).
232
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“[g]iven the reciprocal influence between judge and jury, the
judge’s ability to grant a new trial on the weight of the
evidence may function more as a safety valve than as a
‘denigration of the jury system.’” 238 She explains that “[t]he
fact-finding competencies of judges and jurors are . . . mixed;
each has strengths the other lacks.” 239 And because the law
supplies no clear remedy for a biased conviction, “[t]he trial
judge’s power to evaluate the weight of the evidence and to
order a retrial helps to fill the gap,” particularly “when
deliberative secrecy and post-verdict anti-impeachment rules
conceal the presence of what would otherwise be reversible
error.” 240
The same, of course, is true of an appellate court’s power.
In essence, the jury’s province is to find the facts based on
proper considerations, not improper ones. So “when the court
evaluates the weight of the evidence, it is not asking what
evidence the jury reasonably could have believed. Instead, it
is trying to determine whether the jury reached its verdict
based on bias or some factor other than the evidence before
it.” 241 And, “[r]ather than confining each decisionmaker in the
system to one narrowly defined role,” having both the jury
and the appellate court “perform the same functions (or at
least to have some overlapping jurisdiction)” may “increase
the chance that more interests can have a role in any particular
decision,” 242 thus leading to a more accurate result.
In the end, even if there is a conflict, that conflict is worth
the value that comes from reducing the frequency of wrongful
Robertson, supra note 16, at 177 (quoting Lind v. Schenley Indus.,
Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960)); see also Seward, supra note 131, at 161
(the jury right “is strengthened, not weakened, when the court exercises
its discretionary power to grant a new trial. . . [T]he judge does not
invade the province of the jury; he simply transfers the defendant from
the province of an unfair or inept jury to the province of a new jury.”).
239 Robertson, supra note 16, at 205.
240 Robertson, supra note 18, at 167.
241 Id. at 187–88.
242 Daniel Epps, Checks and Balances in the Criminal Law, 74 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 70 (2021).
238
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convictions. Professor Findley, in reflecting on Professor
Oldfather’s contributions, explains that “analysis of the
comparative institutional advantages of trial and appellate
courts means not that one court should always have primacy
over the other on factual questions, but that primacy ought to
depend on the type of facts at issue, and an assessment of
which court truly has the advantage with respect to that kind
of fact finding.” 243 Distilling institutional competency at so
granular a level may be challenging in general, but it presents
no problem in the criminal-justice context, particularly for
those who prioritize fairness to the defendant over imposition
of criminal liability. After all, we revere the jury’s power
primarily as a means of protecting criminal defendants from
overzealous prosecution, 244 so the rationale for deferring to
the jury is substantially lower when a criminal defendant
seeks to reverse a conviction.
D. Appellate Courts Already Play a Role in Weighing
Evidence—When Considering Whether Trial Error Was
Harmless
Our institutional-competency analysis would not be
complete without recognizing that appellate courts already
play a role in weighing evidence. When confronted with trialcourt error, the appellate court determines whether “it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 245 Doing so requires
the appellate judges to weigh the totality of the record (minus
any erroneous evidence or argument) to determine whether it
is “so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt
that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the
same in the absence of” the error. 246 For example, “appellate
Findley, supra note 2, at 622.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
245 Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
246 Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 405 (1991); see also Carella v. California,
491 U.S. 263, 267 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In the usual case the
harmlessness determination requires consideration of ‘the trial record as
a whole,’ in order to decide whether the fact supported by improperly
243
244
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courts generally find [race-based] prosecutorial conduct to be
improper, [but] they rarely overturn the defendant’s
conviction, often finding no prejudicial impact when the
statement is balanced against the weight of the other evidence
offered against the defendant.” 247
As a justice on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
recently explained, “it would be an overstatement . . . to
suggest that appellate courts are wholly incapable of
rendering judgments about the potential impact of certain
evidence upon the fact-finder, or the ultimate likelihood that
a different result would have obtained.” 248 In these
scenarios—in which no jury has had an opportunity to
consider the record without the offending error—substituting
their assessment for a jury’s is a “familiar exercise” for
appellate judges. 249 When appellate judges can make such a
determination adverse to a criminal defendant, there is no
legitimate place for slavish deference to the jury when it
returns a guilty verdict that the appellate judges themselves
would not have reached.

admitted evidence was in any event overwhelmingly established by other
evidence.” (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983)).
247 Thompson, supra note 6, at 1255 (citing Demetria D. Frank, The Proof
Is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Uncharged Act Evidence & the
Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 25 (2016)).
Other examples: when a trial court admits evidence improperly, the
appellate court will weigh the trial record (minus the offending evidence)
to determine whether the jury would have reached the same result. See,
e.g., People v. Schultz, 475 P.3d 1073, 1101 (Cal. 2020). And when the State
improperly withholds exculpatory material from the defendant (and thus
the jury), in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the appellate
court considers whether the “’result of the proceeding would have been
different’” with the withheld evidence See, e.g., United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 677, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694 (1984)).
248 Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486, 508 n.9 (Pa. 2020)
(Donohue, J., dissenting).
249 See id.
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The only remaining question, then, is how many judges it
should take to reject the verdict. The next Part explains that
the answer to that question is “one.”
IV.

PRESCRIPTIVE PROPOSAL: EACH APPELLATE JUDGE
SHOULD HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON
MANIFEST-WEIGHT GROUNDS.

If we are to take meaningful steps to combat wrongful
convictions, we must invoke every reasonably available tool
for doing so. It is time that we recognize the power of
individual appellate judges to order new trials in criminal
cases, even without the concurrence of the other two judges
on the panel. This proposal would require statutory change at
the federal level 250 and constitutional amendments in most
state jurisdictions. 251
The effect of implicit bias in jury verdicts is the animating
concern. With that in mind, perhaps single-judge reversal
would be most appropriate “when a conviction was
undergirded primarily with evidence known to be of
questionable reliability, such as a stranger-on-stranger
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2018) (“In each circuit the court may
authorize . . . separate panels, each consisting of three judges, at least a
majority of whom shall be judges of that court . . . .”).
251 See, e.g, CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (appellate court “shall conduct itself
as a 3-judge court. Concurrence of 2 judges present at the argument is
necessary for a judgment”); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 8(c) (“In each appellate
term no more than three justices assigned thereto shall sit in any action or
proceeding. Two of such justices shall constitute a quorum and the
concurrence of two shall be necessary to a decision.”); OHIO CONST. art. iv,
§ 3(A) (“[T]hree judges shall participate in the hearing and disposition of
each case.”); id., § 3(B)(3) (“A majority of the judges hearing the cause shall
be necessary to render a judgment.”); ILL. S. CT. R. 22(c) (“Three judges
must participate in the decision of every case, and the concurrence of two
shall be necessary to a decision. “); see also Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle
E. Moody, The Effectiveness of Measures to Increase Appellate Court Efficiency
and Decision Output, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 415, 439 (1988) (“With few
exceptions, [appellate courts] either have only three judges or they decide
cases in panels of three judges.”).
250
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eyewitness identification or ‘jailhouse snitch’ testimony.” 252 I
would add coerced confessions to the list. But my proposal
would not impose any particular conditions; whenever a
single judge on an appellate panel is convinced that the jury
reached the wrong result—or that bias played a role in the
result—that judge should have the power to require a new
trial. The rationales for my proposal are the focus of this Part.
A. The Wrongful-Conviction Problem Requires a Stronger
Institutional Fix Than Scholars Have So Far Proposed
In past decades, the literature often highlighted the
problems of implicit bias and wrongful convictions without
specifying “precisely the procedural vehicle that should be
created or adapted” to solve it. 253 The historical focus on
identifying the problems is understandable given that the
problems are intractable. And no suggested solutions will
enjoy empirical support until after we implement and assess
them (and even then, the efficacy may be difficult or
impossible to measure). The focus on the problems is also
understandable because we need policymakers to appreciate
the need for systemic fixes before we can expect them to
allocate resources toward identifying and implementing
solutions. But I believe the time has arrived. “Until courts and
legislatures are willing to craft safeguards that will address
the impact of bias head-on, the jury system will continue to be
infiltrated with bias.” 254 And we can no longer tolerate that
bias.
If, as the research shows, the underlying problem is a
product of jurors’ reliance on System 1 (intuitive) processing,
two logical interventions suggest themselves: (1) training the
jury to invoke System 2 (deliberative) processing; and
252 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1332; see also Oldfather, supra note 10, at
461 (“[M]isidentifications represent one of the most frequent causes of
wrongful convictions.”).
253 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 344.
254 Thompson, supra note 6, at 1244–45.
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(2) erecting an appellate safeguard to intercede when that jury
training either does not occur or does not suffice. With respect
to the former, Mikah Thompson advocates an open
discussion of racial stereotypes with the jury, in both jury
selection and jury instructions, to draw jurors’ attention to the
issue and thus temper the risk of intuitive decision making. 255
With respect to the latter, several scholars have advocated
greater judicial intervention, at both the trial and appellate
levels, to root out the work of implicit bias. 256 Much of that
discussion has involved manifest-weight review. 257 Professor
Rachlinksi has also suggested increasing “the depth of
appellate scrutiny, such as by employing de novo review
rather than clear error review, in cases in which particular
trial court findings of fact might be tainted by implicit
bias.” 258 These scholars’ ideas are sound, but we need
something more concrete at the appellate level.
Even if we authorize manifest-weight review more
broadly in appellate courts, that step alone would be unlikely
to reach the full extent of the problem. Appellate courts
require two of the three judges on the panel to concur in a
judgment, 259 so manifest-weight review would provide relief
only in those cases in which two judges detected or suspected
that implicit bias played a role in the conviction. 260 Given the
composition of the judiciary 261 and appellate courts’
institutional reluctance to reweigh evidence, 262 it seems highly
unlikely that we can solve the real-world problem with only
a theoretical remedy.
Id. at 1294–306.
See supra notes 25-26, & 167 and accompanying text.
257 See id.
258 Rachlinski et al., supra note 38, at 1231.
259 See supra notes 250–251.
260 Ohio, as noted above, see supra note 203 and accompanying text,
requires all three judges on a panel to reverse on manifest-weight grounds
following a jury trial. See OHIO CONST. art. iv, § 3(B)(3).
261 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 199–202, 221–223, & 236 and accompanying text.
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The judicial reluctance to reweigh the evidence in favor of
a wrongfully convicted defendant of color has explanations
that extend beyond the oft-articulated deference to the jury’s
province. Among them: judges, like juries, are susceptible to
relying on System 1 processing, and research demonstrates
they invoke it in their judging. “[E]ven while pursuing
rational decisions in earnest, judges are like other decision
makers who may unknowingly take mental shortcuts, such as
the subconscious reliance on heuristics, to make complicated
decisions.” 263 That means race makes a difference, even with
judges; “[r]acial influences . . . operate much like the influence
of emotion and other intuitive processes in judges.” 264 And
even racially diverse panels are not enough to overcome the
work of implicit bias; “[e]xposure to a group of esteemed
Black colleagues apparently [is] not enough to counteract the
social influences that produce implicit negative associations
regarding African-Americans.” 265 In short, “judges harbor the
same kinds of implicit biases as others.” 266 So requiring a
panel majority to detect and remediate implicit bias in a jury
verdict is too tall an ask.

Edwards, supra note 8, at 1043; see also id. at 1044. (“[P]rior research
has examined how race, gender, and other characteristics of a defendant
can affect judges’ sentencing decisions”); Johnson, supra note 22, at 265
(“[R]ace may inappropriately skew the credibility determinations of
perfectly respectable judges who do not seem to manifest any animosity,
racial or otherwise, toward African American litigants.”).
264 Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 7, at 103.
265 Id. at 105–06.
266 Rachlinski et al., supra note 38, at 1195. To be sure, Professor
Rachlinski and his collaborators also concluded that, “given sufficient
motivation, judges can compensate for the influence of these biases.” Id.
So they implore the bench to “adopt[] a deliberative approach” to avoid
“intuitive, heuristic-based decision making” that leads them “to make
erroneous decisions.” Guthrie et al., supra note 7, at 31. But it is “unclear”
whether judges with the motivation to avoid bias actually do so “on a
continual basis in their own courtrooms.” Rachlinski et al., supra note 38
at 1225. It is questionable whether enough judges have those motivations
in the first place.
263
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Even when judges are receptive to the argument in the
abstract, they may not be receptive to applying it in a
particular setting when the features of a tainted jury verdict
are so difficult to detect. Professor Robertson argues that the
uncertainty should pose no barrier to a retrial if the evidence
was not enough to “create confidence” in the verdict. 267 In that
circumstance, even if the judge “cannot know” how the jury
reached its verdict “given the needs of deliberative privacy,”
the judge should still order a new trial. 268 Professor Johnson
takes a similar view: “[i]f we wait for proof of racial
animosity, we may be sidetracked.” 269 But these admonitions,
when coupled with System 1 processing at the judicial level,
will not likely persuade enough judges to make a meaningful
difference in appellate outcomes. 270
B. Single-Judge Manifest-Weight Reversal Would Not
Undermine the Tradition of Three-Judge Appellate Panels
There is nothing magical in the requirement that appellate
panels sit in panels of three—and, therefore, nothing magical
in requiring two judges on a panel to concur in the
disposition.
It is true that three-judge panels have been entrenched in
our judicial system “since the circuit courts were created in
1789.” 271 But “there is little, if any, legislative history to
explain with any certainty the reasons behind selecting three
See Robertson, supra note 18, at 198.
See id. Professor Robertson’s argument focuses primarily on trialcourt judges, but the concept applies with equal force on appeal, assuming
the law permits the remedy.
269 See Johnson, supra note 22, at 265.
270 See id. at 324 (“I am unaware of any case in which the need to
reweigh evidence was attributed to biased credibility determinations by
the jury.”).
271 A. Lamar Alexander Jr., En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 563, 571 (1965); see also Mitchell W. Bild, Note, Rethinking the Federal
Courts: Why Now is Time for Congress to Revisit the Number of Judges That Sit
on Federal Appellate Panels, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 335, 338 (2020).
267
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judges—as opposed to any other number—to hear
appeals.” 272 That choice (as opposed to a higher number)
seems to be a function primarily of the desire to foster judicial
economy 273 and a product of the “’three-judge tradition.’” 274
And arguments in favor of even larger panels focus on the
twin goals of “more ideologically balanced decisions” and
“improv[ing] institutional legitimacy.” 275
Diluting the power of individual judges in the context of
important legal rulings perhaps makes sense, particularly in
politically charged times, given that appellate courts “were
intended to harmonize and unify the national law.” 276 But the
same concerns evaporate when appellate judges assess facts at
an individual trial, as they do when assessing evidentiary
weight. In the evidentiary-weight context, the precedential
value of a particular disposition is minimal. Its salience lies
not in the advancement or clarification of the law, but rather
in the potential vindication of an individual, wrongfully
convicted defendant.
C. Single-Judge Reversal Enhances the Unanimous-Verdict
Requirement
Because manifest-weight review addresses questions of
fact, rather than law, the justification for requiring two
appellate judges to concur (much less all three, as Ohio
requires 277) loses much of its resonance. Instead, investing the
power to order a new trial in each individual appellate judge
is a natural extension of the constitutional requirement of
unanimity in jury verdicts for criminal convictions.
Bild, supra note 271, at 340–41.
See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 80–308, at A7 (1947)).
274 See id. at 338 (quoting Alexander, supra note 271, at 573) (emphasis
removed).
275 Id. at 358–59.
276 Cf. Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV.
542 (1969).
277 See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
272
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The Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Ramos v. Louisiana 278
illustrates that requiring unanimous juries is a tool to limit
racially biased verdicts. There, the Court struck down
Louisiana’s allowance of nonunanimous verdicts, explaining
that the origins of that law were to “’establish the supremacy
of the white race.’” 279 The Court explained that Louisiana,
“[w]ith a careful eye on racial demographics, . . . sculpted a
‘facially race-neutral’ rule permitting 10-to-2 verdicts in order
‘to ensure that African-American juror service would be
meaningless.’” 280 So we already recognize the important role
that unanimity plays in protecting against results tainted by
racial bias.
Why, then, should the rule be any different on appeal?
After all, if the appellate court in a manifest-weight review
sits as the thirteenth juror with the power to defeat unanimity
and require a new trial, 281 it seems arbitrary that we dilute
each judge’s participation in that thirteenth-juror role,
particularly given our knowledge that detecting bias in the
jury’s verdict requires a perspective or a willingness to
overcome System 1 processing that many appellate judges
lack. 282 That perspective is key to evaluating someone else’s
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
Id. at 1394 (quoting OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 374 (H.
Hearsey ed. 1898)).
280 Id. at 1394 (quoting State v. Maxie, No. 13–CR–72522 (La. 11th Jud.
Dist., Oct. 11, 2018)).
281 See supra notes 17 & 131 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 28–30, and 66–72 and accompanying text; Oldfather,
supra note 10, at, 444 (suggesting that appellate courts, when determining
the level of deference to accord to trial-court fact finding, should first
undertake an “express consideration of institutional competence as
applied to the specific matters before the court in a given case.”);
Thompson, supra note 6, at 1255–56 n.82 (explaining, in the context of
evidentiary rulings, that “[a]ppellate judges “are unlikely” to find that a
ruling was “‘arbitrary and irrational’”—and thus erroneous—“if they do
not fully grasp that a prosecutor’s improper reference to race can trigger
juror bias” (quoting Demetria D. Frank, The Proof Is in the Prejudice: Implicit
Racial Bias, Uncharged Act Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J.
278
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conduct, as criminal trials inevitably require factfinders to do;
it informs our “empathetic projection: ‘If I did that under
those circumstances, what might I be thinking or feeling?’” 283
In this sense, context matters: “a contextually rich
environment”—which “anthropologists (and legal theorists
influenced by them) call ‘thick description’—situates
behavior in ways that allow the observer to render more
accurate determinations of what occurred.” 284
So instead of viewing the three-judge panel as a collective,
we should recognize it for what it is: three individuals with
different competencies to review the trial-court record, just as
each individual trial juror does, and with equal power to
defeat unanimity.
D. Solvency: Single-Judge Reversal Is Likely to Make a
Difference
There are also compelling reasons to believe that
empowering individual appellate judges to reverse
convictions and order new trials would have a salient effect
on the wrongful-conviction rate.
In the DNA context—which is only a small slice of the
pie 285—Brandon L. Garrett found that a substantial number
(nineteen) out of 200 appellate decisions affirming the
convictions of defendants later exonerated by DNA evidence
were not unanimous—they were marked by dissenting
opinions that “commented on the weakness of the

RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 25 (2016)); Tate, supra note 158, at 609 (“[T]here
is a substantial minor percentage of cases in which different judges may
reasonably reach different conclusions based upon the same appellate
record.”).
283 Risinger, supra note 3, at 1294.
284 See id. at 1295 (quoting Gilbert Ryle, Thinking and Reflecting, in 2
GILBERT RYLE, COLLECTED PAPERS 465, 474–79 (1971), and Clifford Geertz,
Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973)).
285 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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prosecution’s case.” 286 And in cases of reversal, Garrett found
that “ judges made statements in eight cases (6% of the cases
with a written decision) suggesting that the defendant might
be innocent.” 287 If empowered to reverse on manifest-weight
grounds, there is reason to believe that the individual judges
who expressed these concerns might have exercised the
power to order new trials if they had the authority to do so
and even if their fellow panelists disagreed. Professor
Robertson has also documented the unsurprising statistic that
appellate courts invoke manifest weight as the basis for
reversal far more frequently when the right is robust, as it
once was in Texas, than when its availability is doubtful (as in
the federal system). 288
Given how few jurisdictions already offer manifestweight review on appeal, there is necessarily a fair amount of
speculation that accompanies my proposal. Even for Ohio,
where manifest-weight review is already available on appeal,
I have not undertaken to determine how often the court
rejects manifest-weight review by less-than-unanimous
panels. Anecdotally, we know it happens often enough to
matter. 289 And it well may happen more often than we know;
Garrett, supra note 5, at 106.
Findley, supra note 2, at 595 (citing Garrett, supra note 5, at 105).
288 Robertson, supra note 16, at 182 (“The federal circuit courts of
appeals typically reverse just over 2,000 judgments each year, but only a
handful of those reversals—less than 0.5 percent—are based on the weight
of the evidence. In Texas, by contrast, where the right to review is much
more systematized, 4 percent of reversals are based on the weight of the
evidence (footnote omitted)). Texas has since abolished manifest-weight
review on appeal. See supra notes 172–183 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., State v. Metz, 146 N.E.3d 1190, ¶ 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019)
(Gallagher, S., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), appeal allowed,
152 N.E.3d 319 (Ohio 2020); State v. Patel, 147 N.E.3d 97, ¶ 37 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2019) (Delaney, J., dissenting); State v. Bennett, 140 N.E.3d 1145, ¶ 45
(Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (Froelich, J., dissenting); State v. Burns, 2019-Ohio2663, ¶ 78 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (Lynch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); State v. Salazar, 2019-Ohio-2585, ¶ 81 (Ohio Ct. App.
2019) (Brunner, J., dissenting); State v. Ford, 2019-Ohio-2570, ¶ 96 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2019) (Gallagher, E.A., J., dissenting); In re A.S., 2019-Ohio-2359,
286
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there is reason to believe that Ohio’s unanimous-panel
requirement 290 discourages judges from taking the time to
write dissenting opinions addressing manifest weight. Doing
so requires time-consuming (sometimes painstaking) sifting
through the record and writing up an explanation, but that
dissenting opinion would neither alter the result for the
defendant nor advance an understanding of the law for the
public at large. But if that same effort would actually afford
the defendant a new trial, it would serve more than a
symbolic purpose. In short, conferring the power on a single
judge would likely inspire that judge to express her views in
a way that the opportunity to write a mere dissenting opinion
does not.
E. A Second Trial After a Manifest-Weight Reversal Would
Instill Greater Confidence in the Criminal-Justice System
It bears emphasis that a manifest-weight reversal does not
end the case; the defendant must still stand trial again. 291
Courts have “uniformly rejected” the argument that a divided
jury “establishes reasonable doubt [that] requires
acquittal.” 292 So the thirteenth juror, embodied in our single
appellate judge, may do no more than order a retrial.

¶ 34 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (Bergeron, J., dissenting); see also In re S.M.B.,
2019-Ohio-3579, ¶ 123 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (characterizing manifest-weight determination as “a close one”).
These examples do not include cases in which divided panels affirmed on
sufficiency grounds, where the dissenting judge would presumably have
exercised the power to reverse on manifest-weight grounds if given the
power to do so.
290 See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
291 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
292 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). Professor Risinger
takes a different view. He suggests that after a reversal on manifest-weight
grounds—for which he uses the British nomenclature “unsafe verdict”—
“a retrial on the same record should . . . be prohibited—not on double
jeopardy grounds at all, but on the grounds that a second or third
conviction on the same record would a fortiori be subject to reasonable
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That retrial, in turn, offers the defendant an opportunity
to place her fate in the hands of a second jury. Of course, there
is no way to ensure that implicit bias will not infect that
second jury’s deliberation process; the evidence the parties
will present at the second trial is likely to be substantially the
same as the evidence at the first. But studious defense counsel
will consider adjusting the defense tactics to account for
whatever went amiss at the first trial. Perhaps it will mean
greater, or different, focus in jury selection. Perhaps it will
mean refraining from calling a particular witness who did not
play well with the first jury. Perhaps it will mean adjusting
language and imagery in questions and arguments designed
to exploit jurors’ System 1 processing to the defendant’s
advantage. Or perhaps counsel—now wiser about how
implicit bias may have operated the first time—will address
it with the jury directly, calling it out in jury selection and
advocating jury instructions, as Professor Thompson
advocates. 293 I can envision opportunities to call it out in
questioning and jury argument as well. With any combination
of these mitigating steps, a second trial presents a defendant
a greater chance of a result in which implicit bias may play a
lesser role, perhaps converging on the ideal of a fair trial in
which it plays no role at all. 294
In addition to the immediate benefit to the defendant,
retrials in these circumstances instill greater confidence in the
criminal-justice system overall. Some defendants will win
acquittals the second time; others may not. For that latter,
“[t]here is a general presumption that if a second jury agrees
with the first, it was the . . . judge and not the jury who was
doubt, and therefore fundamentally in violation of due process and our
duty to protect the innocent.” Risinger, supra note 3, at 1333.
293 See Thompson, supra note 6, at 1297–1306.
294 See also Robertson, supra note 18, at 199 (“If the judge was right that
invisible error infected the process, then a second jury is unlikely to return
the same verdict—given the safeguards that now exist, it would be highly
unusual for the same bias, misunderstanding, or misconduct to influence
a second verdict.”).
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mistaken about the weight of the evidence.” 295 Under Tibbs,
“even if a single jury verdict might appear against the weight
of the evidence and hence be unjustified, the same verdict
from a subsequent jury based upon the same evidence might
not look so aberrant to the court the second time around.” 296
Of course, with a second conviction would come a second
right to appeal. It is reasonable to ask whether the defendant
should have the right to a manifest-weight review on second
appeal. The answer to that question has to be “yes.” If the
right to a trial free of bias is to have meaning, the remedy for
an improper trial cannot be a second improper one. 297 Public
confidence in the trial system demands that we do it as many
times as necessary to get it right. 298
F. The Costs Are Worth Paying
Finally, the costs of single-judge manifest-weight reversal
are inarguably worth it to society.
The “increase the cost of adjudication” 299 is the only
significant cost. 300 At the appellate level, the recognition of the
Robertson, supra note 16, at 208–09.
Findley, supra note 2, at 635 (citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 42, 43
n.18 (1982)).
297 But see Robertson, supra note 16, at 208 (noting “rules limiting the
number of times that the trial judge may order a new trial.”).
298 See id. at 206 (““[T]he public’s faith in the jury system would likely
increase if the courts had a consistent mechanism by which those
seemingly unfair verdicts could be set aside.”).
299 See id. at 207.
300 There is theoretically another cost; appellate judges willing to
reverse on manifest-weight grounds may suffer political consequences for
doing so, especially in jurisdictions that elect judges. See Findley, supra
note 2, at 606–07 (“No court wants to be responsible for releasing a
defendant convicted of a serious crime and risk the fallout should the
defendant commit another crime. The empirical evidence indicates that
pressures to be ‘tough on crime’ do have a significant impact on judges,
especially in jurisdictions, like most, where judges are elected.” (footnotes
omitted)). But “[t]he Tibbs rule that a weight-of-the-evidence reversal does
not implicate double jeopardy concerns to bar retrial, whatever its
doctrinal or analytical merit, at least has the advantage of permitting
295
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right to manifest-weight review, currently unavailable in
most jurisdictions, 301 would certainly add to the workload. 302
But, as Chad Oldfather has explained, “there is no reason to
believe that the absolute number of appeals would increase
dramatically. Those criminal defendants who are inclined to
appeal their convictions will probably do so anyway.” 303
Indeed, the defendants who would challenge manifest weight
probably would challenge sufficiency in any event, given the
close connection between the two arguments, 304 so the job of
reviewing the record would be no more burdensome. And
once a court permits manifest-weight review on appeal, that
court incurs no marginal cost to extend the new-trial power
to each of the panelists.
For those cases remanded for new trials, the new trials
would of course would entail additional costs. Professor
Robertson notes that a second trial in the civil context “would
appear unaffordably decadent.” 305 In any event, “the
increased adjudication cost may reasonably be the price of
justice.” 306 And that cost concern is less resonant in the
criminal context, where “any gains in factual accuracy should
be highly valued.” 307

appellate courts to engage in aggressive fact review without having to
shoulder full responsibility for acquitting an accused person.” Id. at 634.
301 See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
302 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 482 (“Empowering appellate courts to
review the factual underpinnings of criminal convictions, critics argue,
would open the proverbial floodgates, resulting in even more work for
already overburdened appellate courts.”).
303 Id. at 512; see also id. at 485 (“If . . . one recognizes that appellate
courts are in some respects better positioned to evaluate facts than triallevel fact finders, the judicial economy justification loses much of its
force.”).
304 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
305 Robertson, supra note 18, at 168; see also id. at 189 (“Given the
modern rarity of jury trials, it may seem superfluous and inefficient to
allow not just one trial, but two.”).
306 Id. at 209.
307 Oldfather, supra note 10, at 485.
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The Supreme Court highlighted this conclusion in
Ramos, 308 where it held that nonunanimous juries in criminal
cases are unconstitutional. The Ramos Court rejected a fourjustice plurality’s 1972 opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon, 309 which
had argued that “[s]tates have good and important reasons
for dispensing with unanimity, such as seeking to reduce the
rate of hung juries.” 310 But the Ramos Court assailed that
“breezy cost-benefit analysis” and rejected the Apodaca
premise that “reducing the rate of hung juries . . . always
scores as a credit, not a cost.” 311
If we value fair adjudication, there should be no serious
debate over whether the costs of single-judge evidentiary
reversal are worth it. We do, and they are.
CONCLUSION
We have come a long way since Haywood Patterson was
sentenced to death for a rape that the physical evidence
establishes he did not commit. But it remains beyond serous
dispute that implicit bias plays a role in the systemically
disproportionate convictions of people of color. And if we
mean to do something about that problem, we have to
construct systemic protections. They may have to look
different from the familiar to be effective.
Admittedly, reversal on the vote of one out of three
appellate judges is intuitively troubling. But that intuitive
reaction yet another demonstration of System 1 processing.
Deliberative thinking, by contrast, welcomes the opportunity
for unorthodox solutions to entrenched problems. Singlejudge reversal on evidentiary weight could have a real impact
in reducing wrongful convictions while preserving the juror’s
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
406 U.S. 404 (1972).
310 Id. at 1401 (citing Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411).
311 Id. The Court also questioned “whether any particular hung jury is
a waste, rather than an example of a jury doing exactly what the plurality
said it should—deliberating carefully and safeguarding against
overzealous prosecutions[.]” Id.
308
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ultimate authority to decide guilt or innocence. As Professor
Oldfather observed, what remains “is to put these ideas into
practice.” 312
It’s time for a change as radical as the problem is severe.

312

Oldfather, supra note 10, at 485.

